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ARTICLES
LEGAL MALPRACTICE: A CALCULUS FOR REFORM
Frederick W. Huszagh*
Donald W. Molloy**
I. INTRODUCTION
Our most distinguished professions do not maintain congruency
between membership standards and actual performance. This defi-
ciency is manifest; spiraling malpractice litigation witnesses a sub-
stantial increase in both the number of suits and the amount of
recovery.' Neither the professions nor public can long endure this
trend. Governmental and possibly lay intervention in profession2
affairs is imminent unless the professions move decisively to under-
stand better the dynamics of malpractice and do excise its causes. '
This article examines professional malpractice and existing respon-
ses to it, relates various causes in a calculus that can be employed
to anticipate systemic patterns of malpractice, and suggests several
This article is the culmination of a year's conversation, discussion and argument. The
idea for the article was derived from a problem in Moot Court competition at the University
of Montana Law School. The authors are indebted to W. Corbin Howard for his extensive
involvement in the research and discussion of this article. He contributed substantially to
the many drafts and rewritings of the article.
* Fredrick W. Huszagh, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Montana Law School
1973-1976. B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., L.L.M., J.S.D., University of Chicago.
** Donald W. Molloy, Clerk for the Honorable James F. Battin, Montana Federal Dis-
trict Court. B.A., J.D., University of Montana.
1. Malpractice Woes Hit Attorneys As Lawsuits Against Them Increase, Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 1; Palmer, It's Time To Stop Talking, JOURNAL OF
ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 1975 at 60; Sheehan, The Medical Malpractice Crisis in Insurance: How
It Happened and Some Proposed Solutions, FORUM, Fall 1975 at 80; R. Kroll, Legal Malprac-
tice: Chasing After Insurance, Free Lawsuits, 4 STUDENT LAWYER No. 9, at 10 (May 1976).
2. "Profession" rather than "professional" is used frequently as an adjective to empha-
size the "entity" aspect of profession.
3. "The medical profession has long insisted that it can best police its own ranks, and
it should. Yet, unless all of the agencies involved in medical discipline work together to
improve their methods, outsiders conceivably could take over the control of medical disci-
pline. This must not happen." Derbyshire, Medical Ethics and Discipline, 228 J.A.M.A. 59,
62 (April 1, 1974). Professional Standards Review Organizations [hereinafter referred to as
PSRO's] have already imposed some outside control on the medical profession.
The medical profession does not stand alone as being subject to outside control the
concept is also applicable to the legal and accounting professions. See, Parker, Periodic
Recertification of Lawyers: A Comparative Study of Programs for Maintaining Professional
Competence, UTAH L. REV. 463 (No. 3 Fall 1974) [hereinafter cited as Parker].
The Securities Exchange Commission has disciplined several accounting firms for mis-
conduct. See, e.g., Laventhol, Kerstein, Horwath & Horwath, Accounting Series Release No.
144 (May 23, 1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72, 166; Touche Ross & Company, Accounting
Series Release No. 153, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72, 175.
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approaches that should inhibit the development of such systemic
patterns.
II. MALPRACTICE-WHAT IS IT?
A. A Word
Malpractice is both a word and a concept. Its import as a word
is simple-being the binding of a common prefix and noun. The
noun, "practice", connotes a skill gained by experience, study, or
both. Members of learned professions like medicine, law, and ac-
counting, as well as many occupations not viewed as professions,
possess a variety of specific skills and an understanding of particular
methods for applying those skills to achieve particular ends. What
distinguishes learned professions from occupations is that the spe-
cific skills of a profession are methodically applied according to
certain scientific, historical, and scholarly principles, which all
members recognize by force of organization of concerted opinion
among themselves.' The learned professions view themselves as re-
sponsible for insuring continued improvement of their understand-
ing of such scientific, historical, and scholarly principles.5 Improved
understanding permits continuous development of skills and meth-
ods that more efficiently and effectively achieve desired results and,
thus, better serve the public interest.
When "practice" is joined with the prefix, "mal", it may mean
a number of things in the context of learned professions. It may
mean: (1) professional skills are not applied, (2) professional skills
are applied in a manner not consonant with professional standards,
(3) such skills are applied so as to produce results incongruent with
results normally associated with faithful observation of performance
standards, or (4) member knowledge of scientific, historical, and
scholarly principles underlying such skills and methods is not im-
proved at the rate possible due to lack of profession or member
diligence. There are numerous examples of such malpractice class
in each of the learned professions. Shepherdizing, suturing, and
balancing are skills fundamental to the professions of law, medi-
cine, and accounting respectively. If a profession-member does not
know how to execute basic professional skills, but seeks to handle a
4. See, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1963). See also, Cogon,
Toward a Definition of a Profession, 23 HARV. L. REV. 33, 36 (1953).
5. See, R. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in
American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW &Soc. REv. 9, 16 (1975); L. Mayhew, Changing
Practices in Education for the Professions, SOUTHERN REGION EDUCATION BD. RESEARCH, MON-
OGRAPH No. 17, pp. 1-2 (1971); F. Allen, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with Legal
Education, 62 ABA JOURNAL 447 (April 1976); REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY
FOR THE YEAR 1974-75 FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL.
[Vol. 37
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LEGAL MALPRACTICE
professional task requiring such skills, malpractice exists. Mal-
practice also exists if a professional fails to shepardize a key case in
an appellate brief focusing on a developing area of law, sutures a
wound with unserile instruments, or balances books with figures
not supported by documents having at least facial validity. Even if
technical application of a skill was correct, malpractice would still
exist if the results sought by the public, or an individual, could be
better obtained by proper application of another skill.' Finally, one
might argue that malpractice exists when the profession or a pro-
fession-member is unable to obtain an optimal solution to a prob-
lem of an individual or society solely because of lack of diligence in
advancing its or his knowledge of scientific, historical, and scholarly
principles underlying profession skills and methods.7
B. A Concept
A profession's ultimate utility to society depends on both the
quantity and quality of its efforts to understand and minimize the
four types of malpractice. Theoretically the four-part definition of
malpractice is sufficiently broad to encompass all learned profes-
sions. In practice, however, there is no uniformity among the con-
ceptions of malpractice developed by each profession, and each pro-
fession's conception is much narrower than the etymology of the
word.
The nature of, and reasons for, these deviations between the
word and concepts developed by each profession, as well as devia-
tions between each profession's concept, provide the insights needed
to cope efficiently with the mounting problems of professional mal-
practice. Four factors appear to be fundamental to each profession's
concept of malpractice. These factors focus on: (1) the interests
harmed by malpractice; (2) the assumptions made by those dealing
6. For example, a surgeon may choose to perform a radical mastectomy on a female
patient suffering from breast cancer rather than treat her with equally effective non-surgical
treatment. Although he may complete the surgery and removal of the breast with perfection,
the selection of treatment may cause severe psychological problems for his patient, problems
which might not arise during the treatment phase of the alternative method. If the surgical
choice stems from ignorance of available alternatives, undoubtedly malpractice exists. See,
Crile, Breast Cancer and Informed Consent, J. OF L. AND MED. 18 (July/Aug. 1973).
7. As an example, lawyers have developed many mechanisms to serve societal interests
which research now suggests in fact have serious detrimental effects. Some of these effects
could have been anticipated before the mechanisms became operational. In other situations
the mechanisms remain operational even though their defects are now known. See, THIBAUT
& WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, pp. 54-66 (1975); Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, Order of
Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216-226 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Mashow, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on
the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare
Claims, 59 CORN. L.R. 772 (1974); and ROBINSON & GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS,
pp. 3-18 (West 1974).
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with malpractice about the forces most responsible for its presence;
(3) the measures used to detect its presence; and, (4) the approaches
used to cope with detected presence.
1. Who is harmed?
Ideally the malpractice concept of a learned profession such as
the law should strive to protect four constituencies affected directly
or indirectly by professional action. The institutions or individuals
embodying these constituencies are: (1) clients immediately served
by profession-members; (2) persons other than the clients interested
politically, economically, socially, or emotionally in the transaction
or transaction class; (3) the general society affected by the profes-
sional services rendered to various client classes; and, (4) the profes-
sion involved in the transaction.
Harm from malpractice is most evident when it affects the
individual. Codes of professional conduct dwell extensively on the
various interests of the client, and implicitly assume that faithful
service to the client fully discharges the profession's obligation to
society. Suits against members of various professions grounded
upon theories of malpractice are almost exclusively reflections of
harm to this particular class.
Harm to the client can seldom exist without producing subsidi-
ary harms to close associates of the client or to individuals and
groups, who may at one time or another become associated with
similar types of legal transactions. Although measurable adverse
impact upon these parties exists, their interests are seldom ac-
counted for in current calculi of malpractice. Undoubtedly, the
magnitude of potential harm to this group warrants some accommo-
dation by professional malpractice concepts.'
8. There are many recognized instances when harm to clients also involves harm to
other individuals or groups. If an attorney fails to properly draft a will, not only is his client
harmed by the failure of the instrument to effectuate his intent, but potential heirs are
harmed when they do not receive benefits which would have been bestowed by a properly
drafted will. An ill-prepared attorney may allow an appellate court the opportunity to estab-
lish precedent detrimental to his client. The precedent then presents an impediment which
must be overcome in future proceedings. The resulting harm has direct impact on the imme-
diate client as well as on those interests which must contend with the established precedent
in the future.
Important group interests are also affected in less obvious but equally significant ways.
Many diverse ethnic groups exist, each with a set of values differing markedly from main-
stream cultural values. The values form the foundation for important relationships among
group members. A lawyer insensitive to the values of a client from a particular ethnic group
may offer him a legal alternative or course of action consistent with mainstream values but
contradictory to his peculiar ethnic values. If the client accepts such advice and acts in
reliance thereon, a significant contribution is made concerning the de-emphasis of traditional
ethnic values cementing relationships among members of his group, an important conse-
quence for the entire group. Conn & Hippler, Justice in the Far North: Conciliation and
Arbitration in the Native Village and the Urban Ghetto, 58 JUDICATURE 229 (Dec. 1974). 4
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Society, too, has an interest in the most efficient and effective
resolution of legal disputes. By definition, transactions involving
malpractice are inefficient, and thus indirectly harm society. Fur-
ther, the rapid expansion of government, and the increasing pres-
ence of lawyers in policy-making positions within government, es-
tablish the conditions for direct harm to society If programs and
policies of government at any level are fashioned by lawyers per-
forming below professional standards, the immediate adverse eco-
nomic and social consequences can be extremely large, although the
consequences to any particular individual may be small.'"
Harm to others rarely occurs without ill effects for the profes-
sion. A breach of professional confidence by one lawyer may make
other clients in the same community, especially those involved in
similar transactions, less trusting of their own lawyer's integrity.
The magnitude of harm to the profession is proportionate to the
extent that the breach of professional standards involves the subjec-
tive trust of outsiders. Such trust is quite different in importance
than that which can be objectively evaluated by other clients with
regard to their own affairs. To the extent these fundamental trust
relationships are jeopardized by the misconduct of a single
profession-member, other profession-members will find it more dif-
ficult to efficiently and effectively operate in fields where these trust
relationships are central to the task being performed.
2. Profession Assumptions in Defining Malpractice
If each of the constituencies served by a profession developed a
malpractice concept to secure optimal self-protection, a multitude
of meanings would emerge. Such a diversity of meaning is not evi-
dent in the literature of the professions. Normally each profession
develops a single nebulous conceptualization to serve all interests.
The legal profession, in light of its skills and working environ-
ment, views faithful observation of certain moral standards as the
9. For example, changes in divorce laws may have profound effects upon the family life
of married couples and their children. Such changes may also contribute to the instability of
fundamental social structures. See, Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV.
1, 4-7 (1974). For a more general discussion of the law profession's obligations to society
generally, see, MARKS, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 288-293
(ABF 1972).
10. The classic example of this notion is the case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). The court found that welfare recipients were entitled to an administrative hearing
before their payments could be terminated. The impact of the decision for the claimants was
slight; the payments continued until after the hearing to determine eligibility was had. The
effect on non-welfare recipients and implementing agencies was great; the new interim pay-
ments imposed substantial additional burdens on federal funds. See, e.g., Kihss, Mayor
Assails Relief Rule, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 14, 1972, at 3. See also, Stone, The Public
Influence of the Bar, Id.
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touchstone for ensuring adequate service to each constituency."
Thus, malpractice tends to be defined around acts or omissions
which abrogate these moral standards.
The medical profession, perhaps viewing moral standards as an
ineffective vehicle for protecting the diverse constituencies affected
by their profession, has been inclined to emphasize the more objec-
tive conduct standards dealing with execution and analytical
skills.'2 Harm to various groups concerned with the medical profes-
sion is presumably eliminated when the profession excludes or pun-
ishes members who consistently fall below these standards of execu-
tion.
The accounting profession gives some credence to both moral
and conduct standards in shaping the malpractice concept. How-
ever, the profession seems most concerned with the results derived
from the application of its members' professional skills.'" Thus, the
quality of the results is preeminent and malpractice is most
frequently associated with those transactions where the accoun-
tant's final work product fails to provide a clear statement of a
business's financial condition.
The variance among professions regarding the essence of mal-
practice reflects many factors. Each conceptualization has distinc-
tive values and persuasive theoretical bases. Unfortunately, either
by design or inadvertence, each tends to result in preference for one
constituency harmed by professional malpractice. 4 Thus, any criti-
cal analysis of malpractice within a profession, undertaken with the
objective of reducing harm, must focus on these conceptualizations.
Their evolution must be understood, the forces maintaining their
contours must be mapped, and the values to be derived from
changes must be carefully measured against the costs associated
with bringing about such changes. The major objective for their
11. See e.g., general discussion of discipline within the legal profession, MARKS & CATH-
CART, DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: IS IT SELF-REGULATION?, ABF PUBLICATION No.
5 (1974) reprinted from ILLINOIS LAW FORUM No. 2 (1974).
12. Derbyshire, What Should the Profession Do About the Incompetent Physician?, 194
J.A.M.A. 1287 (Dec. 1965).
13. One of the chief concerns of the accounting profession in the area of publicly owned
corporations is protection of investors who depend on information accountants provide. Wei-
sen, REGULATING TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES, p. 273 (1975). The particular method employed
by an accountant is not as important so long as the resulting report accurately indicates the
financial status of the audited company. Accountable Accountants, Barrons, at 9 (April 26,
1976).
14. The conceptual basis of legal malfeasance is centered on the attorney-client rela-
tionship. It focuses on the moral conduct of the attorney. See MARKS & CATHCART, supra, note
11. The strong emphasis on the conduct of the attorney tends to protect lawyers who are
deficient in requisite skills because when client complaints are entered in the disciplinary
process the initial screening mechanisms tend to look for a moral conduct breach and find
none when the problem complained of involves inadequate performance.
[Vol. 37
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reform must be to protect all four constituencies from unnecessary
harm. There is some point at which the reconceptualization taken
to aid one constituency will subject another to an unjustifiable in-
crease in risk of harm from professional misconduct.'"
3. Detecting Malpractice
The interests to be served and the conceptualizations employed
to insure service to such interests are substantive factors central to
malpractice. Additionally, two procedural factors shape the dimen-
sions of malpractice in any profession: the methods for detecting the
presence of malpractice and the procedures for dealing with cases
of detected malpractice.
Does a falling tree in an uninhabited forest make a sound? The
answers to this classical question of perception provide a good start-
ing point for appreciating how the contours of malpractice are sig-
nificantly controlled by the methods used to detect its presence. If
formal complaints by doctors measure the full extent of medical
malpractice, such malpractice is of insignificant dimension. If pa-
tient dissatisfaction is the measure of its existence, medical mal-
practice might be viewed as a sequel to the black plague. The
method of measuring or detecting malpractice is of utmost import-
ance. A balanced regard for the four constituencies noted earlier
makes the method of detection as much a cornerstone of profes-
sional malpractice as the normative conceptualization of what is
substantive evidence of malpractice.'"
4. Coping with Detected Malpractice
The final factor shaping malpractice within any learned profes-
sion is the procedure for handling detected malpractice or deterring
15. A conceptualization of malpractice which emphasizes harm to the individual may
be detrimental to the well being of the public interest. The converse is also true. A conceptual-
ization which has as its focal point the social interests of the public may prove extremely
harmful to the individual. If the focal point of malpractice is on harm to the profession, many
emerging ideas on how to make professional services available to greater numbers of people
would be jeopardized. Blatant, distasteful advertising might force a standard which does not
allow any advertising. The result: client access to professional services stimulated by adver-
tising would be inhibited or precluded. See, e.g., Nathan, Madison Avenue and the Profes-
sion: What Will the Partnership Be Like? 4 STUDENT LAWYER No. 6 at 10 (Feb. 1976).
16. This statement is exemplified by the legal profession's approach to detecting harm
done to constituencies. The system is directed at discovering harm done to individuals, either
because of a moral breach or because of a performance breach. The concept is prevalent in
both the traditional mechanisms designed to ferret out violations of professional ethics and
in conventional litigation where poor performance is questioned. As a result constituencies
other than immediate clients are ignored. A detection mechanism based on a conceptuali-
zation which considers all constituencies would most certainly cause a reconsideration of
substantive notions of malpractice.
19761
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its occurrence. Contemporary social science research of the Ameri-
can legal system has done much to map the disparities between
"law on the books and law in action."' 7 In the area of legal malprac-
tice, distinguished bar committees have recorded the disparities in
all their splendor." Lawyer-chaperoned suits involving medical
malpractice have performed similar services to the medical profes-
sion, and insurance actuaries have translated this information into
deterrence stimuli. 9 The Securities and Exchange Commission has
been similarly diligent to expose very serious problems between
principle and practice in the accounting profession. 0
The pervasive presence of "untreated" malpractice, even as
bounded by the professions, stems from the use of excessively nar-
row treatment methods in conjunction with the frugality and inepti-
tude associated with their employment.' Thus, the detrimental ef-
fects of malpractice will persist until the reasons for half-hearted use
of inadequate methods are understood, and viable alternatives, sen-
sitive to the forces inherent in the other three factors, are fashioned.
Presumably, negative approaches will continue as the major re-
sponse to detected malpractice, although hopefully greater use of
behavioral science data may foster the development of more effec-
tive negative approaches.2 2 Incipient malpractice presentes a prob-
lem more difficult of efficient solution.23 Undoubtedly some negative
17. The LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW is largely dedicated to publication of "gap" studies
initially advocated by Roscoe Pound. A conceptual analysis of the gap may be found in Abel,
Law Books and Books About Law, 26 STAN. L.R. 175 (1973). A fitting example for this article
of such a gap is discussed in Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organiza-
tional Cooperation of a Profession, 1 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 15 (1967).
18. See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-
MENT-PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, FINAL DRAFT (1970)
[Clark Committee Report]. See also, MARKS & CATHCART, supra note 11.
19. See, Sheehan, supra note 1.
20. See, e.g., Laventhol, Kerstein, Horwath, Accounting Series Release and Touche
Ross & Company, Accounting Series Release, supra note 3.
21. See, Clark Committee Report, supra, note 18, and MARKS & CATHCART, supra note
11. See also, Andres, Revising Lawyer Grievance Procedures Asked in Report to the New York
City Bar, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1976 at 7.
22. Through a more sophisticated use of behavioral science data, classifications of
professional conduct or performance deviants could be established. Based on predetermined
information, one coming within the established classes would either be dealt with by a
grievance committee, ostracized in some other fashion, or subjected to some other disciplinary
procedure. In this way corrective efforts could be directed at those who would most benefit
by it while ignoring those who would, for the most part, not respond to more effective negative
approaches than those now used.
23. For example, the United States Supreme Court decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) recognized the right of
criminal defendant to have an attorney whenever the possibility of incarceration existed.
Before the extensive use of Public Defender offices, members of the bar were appointed to
represent indigent defendants on a rotational basis. How the attorneys chosen to represent a
criminal defendant were selected could have greatly influenced the incidence of malpractice.
An attorney practicing Securities law would in all likelihood be ill-prepared and ill-equipped
[Vol. 37
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approaches may be of value, but it is one of the basic theses of this
article that positive approaches such as incentive programs, sensi-
tivity training, and other forms of education will provide the most
effective weapons against this most serious problem.
The internal substantive skills and the socioeconomic purposes
of the learned professions differ greatly. The relative importance of
the four constituencies concerned with professional activity and the
conceptual focus each profession employs for combating malprac-
tice are dissimilar. Conversely, the professions are remarkably simi-
lar with respect to methods for detecting and treating malpractice,
if one ignores differences in the rigor of their application. These
patterns of diversity and congruency among professions are not a
major point of concern in this article other than to elucidate the
range of matters that professions have considered with regard to
malpractice. However, the detailed study of these patterns of diver-
sity and congruency would be fruitful. The findings would be ex-
tremely useful in assessing the wisdom of replicating successful ac-
tivities of one profession in dealing with the malpractice problems
of another profession.
II. MALPRACTICE-WHAT CAUSES IT?
A. Disagreement about Sources
Comprehensive treatment of the malpractice problem in any
profession must be founded upon an understanding of the short- and
long-term forces that stimulate it. It has been common for
profession-members to style malpractice as a random occurrence
among a small number of professionals, which is a general risk of
doing business. 4 However, the escalating costs of malpractice to the
whole profession or sub-classes within it, have prompted more
sophisticated analysis aimed at identifying geographic and func-
tional areas of practice having disparate rates of identified malprac-
tice. Once these areas are identified, studies may be undertaken to
determine the dominant causes which may include: the complexity
of skills applied, the personalities of clients making use of those
skills, and the personality characteristics of the professionals prac-
to defend a person accused of a capital crime. How to be selective among attorneys without
being so selective as to overburden those found acceptable is an exercise in avoiding malprac-
tice at an incipient stage. For more extensive analysis of malpractice potential inherent in a
legal system concerned with criminal defense work, see Blumberg, supra note 17.
24. Professionals have a tendency to characterize malpractice as being the result of the
conduct or performance of a "few bad apples," and not a problem which must be carefully
analyzed and avoided by the majority. See, e.g., Johnson & Hood, "The Lawyers of Montana"
(a series of articles about the legal profession in Montana, reprinted in pamphlet form from
the Missoulian) at 3 (1974); Wallach, Medical Malpractice: A Professional Dilemma for the
Lawyer, 2 J. OF L. MED. 40 (July/Aug., 1974).
1976]
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tieing those skills. Both quantitative and qualitative information
regarding cause is needed to treat the malpractice problem effec-
tively with the limited resources normally available. Unfortunately,
no profession has undertaken such a systemic analysis to any signifi-
cant degree. The professions have a tendency to fiddle with those
system parts which are easiest to access and manipulate without
disturbing vested interests. The results are most often cosmetic;
long-term solutions are seldom produced.
Although some determinants of malpractice rest outside the
professions involved, many stimuli reside within the profession.
Three important classes of stimuli for malpractice may be found in
each profession: (1) those arising from personal limitations of the
individual profession-members; (2) those primarily involving inade-
quacies in the teaching and training functions associated with the
profession; (3) and those arising from the profession's fundamental
structures, molded by the forces of historical evolution and by close
associations with non-professional institutions over long periods of
time.
B. Individual Limitations of Members
Within the realm of personal limitations, one can order stimuli
according to notions of time or durability, which can in turn be
translated into magnitude of impact. First, there is malpractice
associated with overcharging for services rendered or unauthorized
commingling of client assets for the personal benefit of the profes-
sion member."5 Many of these instances of malpractice can be traced
to temporary lapses in personal judgment, triggered by financial
pressures on the professional, or the temptation to make a one-shot
financial killing, or both. If such weaknesses or temptation afflict
an individual on a recurrent basis, personal moral weakness rather
than external misfortune or temptation should be assigned as the
cause. Personal moral weakness presents a more serious and long-
term problem for the profession. If a professional cannot discern
lines of propriety, he can easily involve himself directly, and the
profession indirectly, in the realm of bribes and other corruptions
of power. Equally important, but seldom appreciated, is the moral
weakness that makes profession-members insensitive to the need for
transcending the narrow behavioral norms inherent in a parochial
society.26 Such transgressions of existing norms may be required to
25. See, Disciplinary Rules 2-106 and 9-102, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
(1972); but see, Blumberg, supra note 17 at 24-28.
26, At times it is necessary to ignore "legalized" behavioral norms in order to positively
direct the development of society. See, e.g., FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE. See also, FEUX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES (Dr. A. Phillips, Ed. 1960) at 239-256.
[Vol. 37
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foster fundamental human and institutional principles deemed es-
sential for society's positive evolution. This type of moral weakness
is likely to have a longer-term effect than personal financial crisis
as a stimulus for malpractice. It is theoretically possible to deal with
the problems of moral weakness during a member's lifetime in order
to eliminate or substantially reduce its significance, but the cost to
the profession of such an undertaking would be prohibitive.
Intellectual or skill limitations are perhaps the most serious of
the personal limitation stimuli. Some areas of professional activity
are extremely complex and require a high level of intellect and
finely-honed skills for the individual to function at an acceptable
level.2 7 If a profession-member does not have the requisite intellect
or skill when entering this type of professional practice, and fails to
associate himself with individuals having such qualities, the result
can only be a persistent pattern of malpractice. Little can be done
to rectify this problem other than to have the individual professional
permanently vacate the practice area.
A related long-term problem concerning personal, intellectual,
or skill limitations results from individuals' inability to jettison fun-
damental skills or methods of analysis central to their practice for
many years. This problem is perhaps most evident in the medical
field. Older, busy practitioners often cannot maintain their level of
practice and simultaneously acquire all the new medical data
needed to support application of new and obviously superior tech-
niques. This third type of personal limitation occurs in areas where
there are rapid changes in approaches requiring considerable cost in
terms of an individual's time.28 In such situations, only those newly
trained will be in a position to handle the entry costs. Thus, those
areas of a profession which are undergoing rapid change will need
to be dominated by the younger professionals if the incidence of
malpractice, especially if measured by results, is to be reduced.
C. Limitations of Education and Training for Whole Profession
Educational and training institutions are normally a profes-
sion's strongest bulwark against the intellectual and skill limita-
tions of members. Institutional activities are the major vehicles for
individuals to attain specific professional skills. Unfortunately, if
deficient they can also breed malpractice affecting large segments
27. Among the plethora of ready examples are brain surgery, antitrust litigation, multi-
party air crash litigation, and preparation of consolidated income statements of multinational
companies.
28. Examples of such areas include cancer treatment, cardiac care, intensive care units
for newborns and such diverse areas of the law as pension planning and criminal procedure.
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of the profession. Such negative influence on the quality of practice
is long term.
Professional schools are being subjected to increasing control by
professions as a whole, both as to numbers being processed" and
subjects being covered.'" Curriculum structure naturally tends to
emphasize interests of particular constituencies now served .3 Con-
sequently, professional conduct relating to other constituencies is
often neglected. Such neglect may be viewed by ignored constituen-
cies as bordering on malpractice.
Apart from the emphasis upon the particular interests that may
be inherent in the curriculum, schools may adopt instructional ap-
proaches to professional responsibilities, which are narrower than
that role explicitly or implicitly assigned to the profession by var-
ious levels of government and society.2 If malpractice is viewed as
a less-than-adequate fulfillment of the assigned role, graduates will
likely fall short of expected standards of performance unless some
corrective force is applied after graduation. Unfortunately, such
"built-in" inadequacy tends to endure for generations of profession-
als.
Since professional schools cannot adequately provide students
with necessary experience, on-the-job supervision associated with a
particular profession substantially influences the incidence of mal-
practice. This follows because professional service is the product of
both raw knowledge and experience concerning proper application
of that knowledge. In professions where practice is normally done
in larger firms or clinics embodying both experienced and inexperi-
enced professionals, it is possible to ensure that most professional
tasks are handled by individuals possessing the appropriate blend
of both knowledge and experience. However, without group prac-
tice, or if group practice is developed solely to achieve economies in
administrative services rather than to permit specialization, quality
control resulting from experience will be minimal. The likely result
is a higher incidence of malpractice, especially where experience is
29. See, e.g., Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a
Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 244 (1968).
30. The judiciary, as an element of the legal profession, is attempting to exert control
over law school curricula. Pedrick & Frank, We Are Faced With A Clear and Present Danger,
LEARNING AND THE LAW (Winter 1976); Cutright, Cutright, and Boshkoff, Course Selection,
Student Characteristics and Bar Examination Performance: The Indiana University Law
School Experience, 27 J. LEo. ED. 127 (1975); further discussion of Indiana's Rule 13 is
provided in Beytagh, Prescribed Courses as Prerequisites for Taking Bar Examinations:
Indiana's Experiment in Controlling Legal Education, 26 J. LEG. ED. 449 (1974).
31. Consumer advocate Ralph Nader, among others, asserts that law school curricula
emphasize business interests excessively. Nader, Ralph Nader Asks Law Students to Change,
24 Harv. L. S. Bull. 32 (April, 1973); See also, Thaler, What is Left of You After Law School,
4 STUDENT LAWYER No. 7 at pp. 14-15 (Mar. 1976).
32. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975); Thaler, Id.
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critical to satisfactory performance of the assigned role.3 When this
experience acquisition function is inadequately carried out through
group practice, the stimulus to malpractice will be as long term as
that of the educational institutions.
Continuing professional education can serve as a powerful tool
to minimize the initial shortcomings of professional education as
well as inadequate on-the-job supervision or experience acquisition.
Its potential for combating problems of malpractice is great when
mandatory continuing professional education is a requisite for
maintaining professional standing.34 However, this educational op-
portunity is frequently imbued with the same limitations inherent
in the original professional education. Consequently it may become
a long-term stimulus for malpractice itself, especially in areas where
an important dimension of professional practice transcends the
application of narrow technical skills.
D. Limitations of the Profession's Structure
Perhaps the longest term stimulus for professional malpractice
flows from the profession's general structure. It has been argued that
an important element of the professional structure is the division of
the economic market so that the more lucrative areas of professional
practice are reserved for those having control over the profession's
general structure.3 5 In essence, power derived from the structure is
used to maintain intra-professional divisions for the benefit of select
members rather than to ensure client protection. There is evidence
concerning many professions that the professional structure is also
used to foster a conspiracy of silence among members to minimize
the identification and treatment of individual incidents of malprac-
tice.3 ' To the extent the structure does foster this conspiracy of
33. For the neophyte lawyer the necessity of experience is manifest in areas such as
drafting complex trust instruments involving the assimilation of materials from the Internal
Revenue Code, state statutes and case law. In the medical field the necessity of experience
bears a direct relationship to the number of years of residency for board certification. An
interesting parallel is that those areas of medical practice which ostensibly rest on experience
are usually the areas with the highest insurance premiums for malpractice coverage.
34. Parker, supra, note 3.
35. See, Akers, The Professional Association and the Legal Regulation of Practice, 3
LAW & Soc. REV. 463, 477 (1968); Shuchman, supra, note 29; see also, Cohen, Confronting
Myth in the American Legal Profession: A Territorial Perspective, 22 ALA. L. REV. 513, 523
(1970).
36. Physicians and surgeons as a group have the reputation of being participants in a
"conspiracy of silence." Note, The Montana Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice Claims,
36 MONT. L. REv. 321, 325 (1975); Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEVELAND-MARSHALL
L. REV. 520 (1965). In California, suit was brought against a group of doctors for conspiracy
to obstruct the ends of justice by their refusal to testify in a malpractice action. Agnew v.
Parks, 172 Cal. App.2d 746, 343 P.2d 118 (1959). See also, Note, The California Malpractice
Controversy, 9 STAN. L. REv. 731 (1957).
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silence, it is a powerful stimulus for malpractice.
Professional structure also precludes formal involvement of lay
persons concerning assessment of the short- and long-term ade-
quacy of professional services for the four constituencies. Conse-
quently, malpractice tends to be narrowly conceived and often ig-
nores responsibility to serve presently neglected constituencies. Fur-
ther, pressures are absent for reconceptualization of service obliga-
tions, which would prompt development of methods and resources
necessary to preclude inadequate professional representation of neg-
lected constituencies."
Finally, if a profession underfunds tasks assigned to it, and yet
insists on a supervisory monopoly of those functions, there is a high
probability the structure will have the effect of limiting the ade-
quate flow of resources for detecting and coping with individual and
systemic malpractice. 8 If this occurs over long periods, there will be
efforts to deal with the malpractice problem, at least insofar as
individuals are involved, through malpractice suits or insurance
where case disposition is not dominated by the injuring profession.
Obviously, there exists an abundance of other opportunities for use
of the professional structure as a force of good or evil regarding
malpractice. Professional structure must be a critical focus when
dealing with malpractice because of its long-term effect and the
serious impact on short-term problems.
IV. MALPRACTICE-CURRENT APPROACHES OF PROFESSIONS
A. Overview
Many activities of learned professions have a prophylactic ef-
fect on the scope and impact of malpractice: some preclude its
occurrence, others retard the frequency of its presence, and still
others limit the severity of its harm and punish those responsible.
These activities may also serve to: (1) maintain boundaries between
the profession and others; (2) divide markets among profession
members; or (3) facilitate profession competence to handle new
problems or deal more effectively with existing problem classes.
Some evidence indicates that attorneys are losing their reluctance to "commit fratri-
cide." Sandier, A Shopper's Guide to Professional Liability Insurance, LEGAL ECONOMICS,
(Fall 1975).
37. In Montana a screening panel is used to assess the merit of malpractice claims. If
the panel of doctors and lawyers determines a claim is meritorious, expert testimony is readily
available. See, Note, The Montana Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice Claims, Id.
38. The Clark Committee found that legal disciplinary committees were underfunded
and understaffed. A related criticism was that the committees did not undertake continuing
investigations of particular problem areas. Supra note 18. See also, Revising Lawyer Griev-
ance Procedures Asked in Report to the New York City Bar, supra note 21.
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Some activities have a long and venerable history while others are
inventions of contemporary times. Though all activities seek to deal
directly or indirectly with the malpractice problem, they dwell al-
most exclusively on limitations of individual members. Conse-
quently, focus is on rather short-term causes of malpractice. In re-
cent years dialogue has increased concerning inadequacies of educa-
tion and training, but dissension characterizes discussions of reme-
dies.39 Some remedies will produce short-term improvement, but
patently overlook the professions' long-term responsibilities to nur-
ture innovation that will allow better service to all four constituen-
cies.
Methods now employed by the learned professions to eliminate
incompetent practitioners or motivate them to acquire needed
knowledge and skills center on (1) peer review, (2) self-assessment
testing, (3) continuing professional education on a mandatory or
voluntary basis, (4) specialization, (5) license board testing, and (6)
disciplinary organizations within the profession. Several methods
are utilized to some extent by all professions. Others seem viable to
only one, because of peculiarities in relationships between the pro-
fession, its constituencies, and subject matter concerned. The em-
phasis accorded various methods by each profession is different and
seems to reflect the scope and intensity of its past and current
malpractice problems. Outlined below are the methods each learned
profession relies upon to maintain the quality and utility of its serv-
ices. Although summary only, the descriptions disclose variations in
emphasis among professions accorded each method. These varia-
tions indirectly reflect their divergent concern for conduct, perform-
ance, and morality.
B. Doctors - Focus on Skills and Methods
1. Peer review, both informal and formal, is a fundamental
deterrent to malpractice. ° With increasing frequency, doctors are
practicing in groups through clinics and specialty offices. Within
this context associates are chosen and at times asked to leave, after
assessment of their previous and current performance. Although
such decisions are not taken lightly, they normally are not imbued
with great formality. In contrast, formality is highly evident in hos-
pitals where various committees evaluate physician performance
39. See, Mayhew, CHANGING PRACTICES IN EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS, and Allen,
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with Legal Education, supra note 5.
40. Peer review is an effective deterrent to malpractice from within the profession rather
than from without. A physician ostracized by his peers is likely to be followed by the reputa-
tion initially developed which occasioned his dismissal and other doctors are not likely to
accord privileges or referrals to one with a poor peer appraisal.
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involving hospital facilities. Several levels of supervision exist, with
physician experience and expertise tending to correlate with free-
dom from supervision. However, if the quality of a physician's per-
formance deteriorates, he may be subjected to close supervision
without being totally ousted from the staff.'
Other forces fostering peer review within hospitals are the de-
tailed guidelines promulgated by the Joint Commission on Accredi-
tation of Hospitals.2 These guidelines require hospitals to establish
"essential qualifications" each individual must possess to practice
in the hospital and to establish regulatory meetings of specialty
groups to analyze medical work performed. Despite the guidelines
and their extended application in theory, their real import is muted
by the fact most hospital staff efforts are directed at ensuring effi-
cient use of facilities rather than evaluating individual physician
performance. 3
Recent embellishments of peer review are the Professional
Standards Review Organizations (PSRO) mandated by the Social
Security Act.44 As a condition precedent to government reimburse-
ment for services under Medicare, Medicaid, and other plans, Con-
gress requires evidence of the necessity and quality of medical serv-
ices rendered. PSRO's composed of local doctors" certify compli-
ance with Congressional requirements to the funding sources. Mem-
bership on the PSRO's is rotated frequently to facilitate diversity
and broad awareness of PSRO standards." Supervisory panels
formed at the state and national levels unify the standards estab-
lished by the local PSRO's17 Presumably as general awareness of
the standards develops, doctors will evaluate their own performance
against such standards.
2. Self-assessment, apart from peer review, is now institution-
alized by nearly a third of the national medical specialty societies
to foster professional consciousness raising.48 Members take various
multiple choice and other types of tests covering skills and methods.
The tests are graded by the specialty societies or the individual.
41. Derbyshire, What Should the Profession Do about the Incompetent Physician,
supra note 12; Talkington, Hospital Medical Staff Law and By-Laws, 14 WASHBURN L. J. 443
(1975); Parker, supra note 3; Trout, Should the States Act on the Malpractice Problem?, 1
J. oF L. MED. 32 (Nov./DEc. 1973).
42. See, Talkington, supra note at 446 for a compendium of the JCAH guidelines.
43. Parker, supra note 3, at 468.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c. See Parker, supra note 3, at 468 for an excellent discussion of
PSRO's.
45. 42 U.S.C. §1320c-1(b).
46. 42 U.S.C. §1320c-4(d).
47. 42 U.S.C. §1320c-5(a).
48. Note, Medical Education in the United States, 1972-73, 226 J.A.M.A. 893, 956
(1973). See, also, Parker, supra note 3.
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Physician response to some programs has been excellent. The pro-
grams facilitate physician awareness of performance standards and
allow evaluation of individual competence regarding such standards
without risk of embarrassment.
3. Continuing education is a hallmark of the medical profes-
sion, and some is mandatory." For example, the Oregon State Medi-
cal Society requires members to complete 150 hours of instruction
every three years. Doctors' involvement in this program has been
extremely high, even though society membership is optional to li-
censing, because such membership is a requisite to use of many
Oregon hospital facilities. 5° Three states authorize their boards of
medical examiners to require continuing education as a prerequisite
to certification,' and it seems likely this number will grow.
Voluntary continuing education programs sponsored by major
medical organizations have been available to most doctors for many
decades. The range of subjects covered and presentational formats
is enormous as has been the doctors' response. Since 1968, the
American Medical Association has even offered a Physician Recog-
nition Award to all doctors completing 150 hours of instruction
within a three-year period.5" By 1973, 40,585 doctors had qualified
for the award.53
4. Specialization has long been employed by the medical pro-
fession to improve members' skills in narrow, complex fields. In
theory, specialization permits doctors to increase the depth of their
technical knowledge and to utilize highly refined, expensive equip-
ment. Specialized services are applied to community medical needs
through clinics seeking to insure medical coverage across the full
range of possible body malfunctions. Unfortunately, specialization
in practice has not achieved all its theoretical benefits. Flaws in
concept implementation tend to increase medical service costs and
stimulate malpractice claims. The reasons for such unwanted re-
sults are many, but two are particularly pertinent to this article.
Often efforts to specialize fail to recognize that medicine is not
solely the application of special professional skills. Correct diagnosis
of many patient maladies rests heavily on self-reporting. Patient
49. See, e.g., Dornell, Ohio Strives to Solve the Medical Malpractice Problem, 4 J. OF
L. MED. D30 (Jan. 1976). See also, Parker, supra note 3, at 482.
50. Parker, supra note 3, at 446. See also, Libby, Weinswig & Kirk, Help Stamp Out
Mandatory Continuing Education!, 233 J.A.M.A. 797 (Aug. 1975).
51. The states are New Mexico, §67-5-3(E), NEW MEX. STATS. (1953); Maryland, Art.
43 §121(2), ANN. CODE OF MD. (1957); and Kansas, §65-2809, KAN. STAT. ANN. (1972).
52. Note, Medical Education in the United States, 1969-70, 214 J.A.M.A. 1487 (1970).
53. Parker, supra note 3, at 483. See also, Sherrer & Sherrer, The Lawyer's Recognition
Award: A Suggested Program for Upgrading and Structuring Continuing Legal Education,
32 FED. B. J. 26 (1973).
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disclosures are stimulated in no small way by the patient's feeling
of trust in the doctor. 4 However, in contrast with a family physi-
cian's patient relationship, many specialist-patient relationships do
not foster this trust. These relationships may also fail to motivate
optimal patient acceptance of prescribed treatment, a critical as-
pect of successful recovery in many situations. These factors, all
important to successful medical care, are not fully compatible with
the concept of specialization. Execution of the concept to date, espe-
cially in urban areas, has done much to emphasize these elements
of incompatibility.
5. Licensing boards, normally composed exclusively of medi-
cal doctors, among other things, seek to deny entry to individuals
not possessing skill and method competence." Their authority to
limit entrance, as well as expel, derives from the state police power.
Although their inherent power is extensive, the screening techniques
employed in the licensing are crude in comparison with the physi-
cians' range of responsibilities, and such boards seldom mandate
expulsion. Only fifteen states, as of 1974, identified professional
incompetence as a ground for disciplinary action;57 Montana's law
permits license suspension for gross malpractice, negligent practice
or professional misconduct. Despite pervasive authority, history
provides little evidence that licensing boards deal aggressively with
profession inadequacy after admission. Even admission screening,
in light of the criteria employed, can seldom do more than ensure
that members initially possess knowledge of textual skills and
methods.
6. Grievance committees of state and local medical societies
ostensibly undertake investigations of incompetent member action
upon the complaint of a patient or colleague, and act to preclude
recurrences of such substandard conduct. Their proximity to the
parties harmed and the situs of the harmful conduct should make
such committees a most vital deterrent to malpractice, but the re-
cord suggests otherwise. 9 Frequently, such disciplinary organiza-
54. Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970); Breckler, Price & Shore, Informed Consent: A New
Majority Position, 1 J. oF L. MED. 13 (July/Aug. 1973).
55. Licensing in Montana follows this general pattern. See Revised Codes of Montana
(1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], §82A-1602.2 (Accountants); R.C.M. 1947, §82A-
1602.15 (Doctors); and R.C.M. 1947, §93-2013 (Attorneys). Montana is somewhat unique in
that under the court's interpretation of the Montana Constitution the legislature has no
authority to regulate the licensing of attorneys. In Re Senate Bill 630, 164 Mont. 366, 532 P.2d
484 (1974).
56. Derbyshire, Medical Ethics and Discipline, supra note 3.
57. Id.
58. R.C.M. 1947, §66-1037.
59. Derbyshire, Medical Ethics and Discipline, supra note 3.
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tions lack the manpower needed for effective supervision. The reluc-
tance of doctors to report suspected misconduct of colleagues, when
added to such manpower limitations, makes comprehensive internal
discipline an elusive goal. The value of this deterrent is further
limited by the fact that doctors may continue to practice even after
expulsion. 0 Only when state medical society membership is a requi-
site for the use of hospital facilities can discipline by expulsion have
substantial deterrent value. These impediments have prompted
skepticism about internal disciplinary effectiveness even among
profession members. One physician, writing in the JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION concludes: "Does organized medi-
cine adequately discipline unethical physicians? The answer is
no."6
C. CPA's-Focus on Results and Methods
An accountant's impact on his client is obviously not as per-
sonal as a doctor's impact on his patient. However, an accountant's
individual work product frequently affects many individuals other
than those commissioning the work. Many day-to-day dealings of
modern commerce rest on the assumption that his work product
accurately reflects financial reality. The reliance of government offi-
cials and other individuals on the work executed by accountants on
behalf of single clients necessitates employment of dependable
methods for ensuring quality control. Although the accounting pro-
fession uses fewer mechanisms than other professions for maintain-
ing acceptable levels of performance by its members, those utilized
are quite effective.
1. Peer review in the accounting profession does not have a
long history, but is rapidly becoming vital for the profession's de-
terrence of substandard performance. In 1974 the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants adopted a plan providing for
panels of accountants to review work products and procedures of
other accounting firms." Panel reports are submitted only to the
firm being examined and current procedures do not provide for
follow-up corrective action to insure compliance with professional
standards .3
In addition to internal peer review implemented on a voluntary
60. Doctors are not required to maintain membership in a medical society to practice
medicine in Montana. R.C.M. 1947, §66-1025.
61. Derbyshire, Medical Ethics and Discipline, supra note 3, at 60.
62. Mims & Hutchins, Accounting-A Review to Make the Audit Credible, Bus. Week,
June 22, 1974 at 84.
63. Boyle & Holton, Peer Review in the Accounting Profession-Who Audits the
Auditor?, 45 C.P.A.J. 15 (Jan. 1975). See also, Mims & Hutchins, supra note 62.
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basis, the systemic importance of accountants' work products has
prompted outside entities to stimulate in various ways the concept
of peer review. The Securities and Exchange Commission periodi-
cally has occasion to discipline CPA firms whose performance falls
below SEC standards.64 Firms so disciplined have been required to
submit to review by other CPA firms. 5 The SEC's aggressive pos-
ture concerning accounting standards is understandable in light of
the key role accounting plays in making SEC disclosure principles
a meaningful form of protection for the public. There are some
parallels with the medical profession's PSRO procedures,66 but
clearly the SEC is more interested in the integrity of results than
the propriety of certain methods and procedures in specific cases, a
concept central to the PSRO system.
2. Continuing education, although a vigorous activity within
the accounting profession, can hardly be viewed as a primary deter-
rent to substandard professional performance. However, it has
achieved some prominence as a formal deterrent when contrasted
with other professions. Fourteen states have some continuing educa-
tion requirement for accountants.67 In another twelve states, either
the State Board of Accountancy or the State Accounting Society is
on record as supporting mandatory continuing education,6" while
another several states promote voluntary continuing education pro-
grams.
3. Licensing is an integral part of the profession's activities for
insuring maintenance of professional standards. Such licensing,
derived from the state police power, focuses on minimum educa-
tional requirements and satisfactory performance on a five-part na-
tional examination.69 Because of the relative objectivity of the skills
and results associated with the profession in contrast with law and
medicine, these licensing procedures are an extremely vital instru-
ment for ensuring minimum professional competence. In most
states, profession members are subject to discipline by the state
licensing board should they be involved in dishonesty, fraud, gross
64. 17 C.F.R. §20.2e (1975); See, Laventhol, Kerstein, Horwath & Horwath, supra note
3; Touche Ross & Company, supra note 3; and In the Matter of Laux, Gose & Co., Account-
ing Series Release No. 160 (Aug. 27, 1974), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72, 182.
65. See, e.g., In the Matter of Benjamin Botwinick & Co., Accounting Series Release
No. 168, Exchange Act. Release No. 11176 (Jan. 13, 1975), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72, 190.
66. Id.
67. Parker, supra note 3, at 478.
68. Id.
69. The C.P.A. examination is given nationwide on the same day at approximately the
same hour to all persons taking the exam. In Montana certification as a certified public
accountant is available to any person meeting the requirements set forth in R.C.M. 1947, §66-
1819.
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negligence, or a violation of the rules of the state board."0
4. Internal disciplinary activities of the accounting profession
are vital, primarily due to the demands of external interests highly
dependent on the accountants' performance. The profession's ethi-
cal standards, particularly its concepts of independence and report-
ing techniques, are matters of great concern to the profession,
largely due to the influence of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.71 The SEC wants the investing public to gain accurate finan-
cial information concerning companies whose stock is traded pub-
licly. Thus, the profession is encouraged to ensure member observ-
ance of uniform procedures for reporting essential to facilitate pub-
lic comparison of various investment opportunities. Further, the
profession is diligent in its insistence that members maintain inde-
pendence from clients to facilitate faithful application of these uni-
form procedures. Normally, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants establishes the uniform standards for reporting
and serves as the clearinghouse for establishing principles that en-
sure independence of profession members from client interests. The
impact of these standards on profession members is especially high
in comparison with that associated with the medical and legal pro-
fessions. This is primarily the consequence of the ease with which
performance of profession members can be measured against de-
fined standards.
D. Lawyers-Focus on Conduct
1. Competence measurement and maintenance activities of
the legal profession are best characterized as complex and confusing
when compared with the medical and accounting professions. The
diverse roles of lawyers have made standards for competency mea-
surement elusive. Attorneys concerned with the many facets of tax-
ation or title searches employ specific skills and methods analogous
to the routines of the medical and accounting professions. However,
lawyers also serve at times as analytical generalists. In this capacity
they fashion strategies for client action on the basis of cumulative
judgment derived from diverse experiences; strategies that blend
many seemingly unrelated skills and methods. The harms caused by
lawyer malpractice, like the diverse roles of lawyers, are devoid of
the distinctive patterns frequently associated with other learned
professions. Some legal misfeasance resembles medical malpractice
70. See, e.g., R.C.M. 1947, §66-1834.
71. MEIGS, LARSEN & MEIGS, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING (5th ed. 1973). See also, Code of
Professional Ethics, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1972); also,
Accountable Accountants, supra note 13.
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by producing severe personal harm such as imprisonment, loss of
child custody or significant financial liability. Other types of attor-
ney misjudgment can result in errant government or corporate ac-
tivities harmful to many thousands of people and entities over long
periods of time.
Diffusion of roles and attendant potential harms are paralleled
by dissimilarities among member skills, styles, substantive inter-
ests, and operating philosophies.72 While doctors and accountants
within their respective professions have many common experiences
of substance and procedure, lawyers enjoy few points of communal
feeling. Courts and judges are the only dominant common reference
points. Ironically, in many jurisdictions a significant number of
lawyers have little contact with judges of courts at any level.73
Despite these differences within the profession concerning the
techniques and skills employed, interests served, and resultant
harms of malpractice, the public expects the profession to respond
to societal needs as a somewhat unified group. Legal incompetence
of all varieties is expected to be resolved with singular cures imple-
mented by the profession's most visible representatives, bar associa-
tions. For reasons not easily discerned, the profession has resorted
to standards that center mainly on the morality of conduct, includ-
ing the ethics of diligence, rather than on satisfactory execution of
fundamental skills or minimal standards of performance and result.
2. Peer review within the legal profession has not developed
as a meaningful stimulant of competence or a deterrent of malprac-
tice. Legal practice is dominated by sole practitioners and small
partnerships.74 Since contact among peers occurs mainly within an
adversarial context in and out of courts, little objective evaluation
of performance or result occurs. Even in firms involving a number
of lawyers, specialization tends to retard internal review because of
the absence of overlapping expertise. When specialization is absent
in firms numbering over five, the essentials of review are often miss-
ing because partners tend to operate independently on matters of
substance.
Only in large firms is peer review likely to be a vital mechanism
for ensuring competence. Consistent substandard performance by a
firm member jeopardizes the firm's interests directly and indirectly,
and is thus likely to prompt other members to insist on the errant
member's departure. In firms where the workload of partners and
associates is highly interdependent, inadequacy will be most
72. For an excellent discussion of this matter, see, Cohen, Confronting Myth in the
American Legal Profession, supra note 35.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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promptly discovered and corrective action taken.
Referrals among lawyers, even those engaged in small firms, are
other mechanisms permitting peer review on an informal basis. Nor-
mally, competent lawyers would not refer to substandard practi-
tioners.7" However, the number of referrals made within a given
community is not likely to be large enough to make loss of referrals
a significant deterrent to incompetence.
Legal lists are another nebulous exercise in peer review."
Martindale-Hubbell secures opinions from attorneys and judges,
who have had contact with the attorney being rated. However, these
inquiries are not directly concerned with competence. Published
ratings dwell mainly on the length of an attorney's practice, his
promptness in paying bills, his financial worth, and "other relevant
considerations" that do not directly reflect competence.77 The rat-
ings favor established practitioners and embody little objective
evaluation of professional skill and performance. Although the
Martindale-Hubbell rating can be important to a lawyer's practice,
the publisher will not reveal sufficient information to evaluate the
accuracy of the ratings.78 Such a policy is hardly consistent with a
system of meaningful peer review.
3. Continuing legal education (CLE) has long been used to
maintain member awarness of recent substantive developments in
specific fields." The popularity of voluntary courses has increased
substantially in the last decade because of rapid expansion in the
areas of the law involving consumer protection, and major upheav-
als in established fields such as commercial transactions, probate,
family law, and land use planning."' Many of these courses center
around dialogue. In recent years written materials have also been
75. In New Jersey the question did arise when an attorney transferred a client's personal
injury case to an out-of-state attorney. The client was subsequently subjected to harm by the
out-of-state attorney's criminal misconduct. The referring attorney was not found to be negli-
gent even though he did not inquire into the out-of-state attorney's reputation for honesty
because the referring attorney had verified the out-of-state attorney was a licensed practi-
tioner. Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F.Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975). See also, Avoiding Malpractice,
4 STUDENT LAWYER No. 7 at 20 (Mar. 1976).
76. See, e.g., Comment, Legal Ability Ratings and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61
KENTUCKY L. J. 1034 (1973).
77. See inside cover of MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1975).
78. See, Comment, supra note 76, at 1038.
79. Note, Continuing Legal Education: A Significant Trend for the Kansas Legal
Profession, 14 WASHBURN L. J. 450 (1975).
80. As examples of the extensive nature of CLE, see ALI-ABA CLE REVIEW, Vol. 7 No.
14, April 2, 1976 (Cosponsored by the University of Wisconsin, dealing with "Uniform Com-
mercial Code" and "Estate Planning In Depth"), and ALI-ABA CLE REVIEW, Vol. 7 No. 22,
May 28, 1976 (Sited at The University of Colorado, covering "Environmental Litigation" and
"Modern Real Estate Transactions"). The ALI-ABA CLE REVIEW is published weekly by the
American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional
Education.
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an integral part of the activity and provide practitioners with "take-
home" access to new developments. s'
The location of these courses varies. Some are tendered in resort
settings to ensure higher levels of attendance, though perhaps lower
levels of attention. Others are offered in the practitioners' own envi-
ronment on afternoons, during long lunches, or over weekends. In
the past, local bar associations have been the dominant organizers
of short, simple programs. However, CLE has tended to become
more sophisticated as law schools in some states have undertaken,
on behalf of the bar, to develop and sponsor such activities.2 As the
presentations have become more sophisticated, a number of com-
mercial organizations have become involved, with a consequent
advancement in instructional techniques, and an improved focus on
lawyering skills.
The advent of video and electronic data retrieval technology
also has done much to stimulate this emphasis on both old and new
skills. The results of this activity can only be an improved level of
competence in traditional skills. Moreover, the new technological
skills may soon be essential for competence in the many fields where
the laws and regulations have become extremely complex, so com-
plex as to defy comprehension without the aid of sophisticated re-
trieval techniques.
Unfortunately, most of these voluntary activities have the ef-
fect of increasing the competence of some members, but provide
little systematic aid for deterring incompetence or raising the mini-
mum threshold of competence. Ironically, few of the voluntary ac-
tivities deal with notions of "conduct morality"-presently the
basic standards for measuring the need to exclude members from
practice.
Improving the threshold of competence has recently become a
81. See, California Continuing Education of the Bar, CEB CATALOG, (State Bar of
California, Spring 1976). The catalog lists the myriad of books, supplements, and tapes
available to members of the California Bar on continuing education. "A typical CEB Book
presents the steps normally followed in a transaction (such as a sale of real property) in the
chronological order encountered in practice. It contains applicable forms or other documents,
separated into paragraphs, followed by explanatory comments. These comments summarize
the relevant legal authorities and alert the lawyer to any practical problems raised by the
use of the forms." CEB CATALOG at 5.
82. Wisconsin, Alabama, South Carolina, and Oklahoma have Law Centers responsible
for CLE in the respective states. See also, Mayhew, CHANGING PRACTICES IN EDUCATION FOR
THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 5, at 63-65.
83. See, Miller, The Effects of Videotape Testimony in Jury Trials, B.Y.U.L. REv. 331,
(No. 2 1975); Williams Juror Perceptions of Trial Testimony as a Function of the Method of
Presentation, B.Y.U.L. REv. 375 (No. 2 1975); Short, An Assessment of Videotape in the
Criminal Courts, B.Y.U.L. REV. 423 (No. 2 1975); Bermant, Critique-Data In Search of
Theory In Search of Policy: Behavioral Response to Videotape in the Courtroom, B.Y.U.L.
REV. 467 (No. 2 1975).
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point of major concern to many profession leaders. This has resulted
in some states, like Minnesota and Iowa, imposing mandatory con-
tinuing legal education requirements on all those practicing within
the state. 4 In addition, the Kansas Bar has formally asked its state
supreme court to approve the imposition of mandatory continuing
legal education requirements."5
The Minnesota approach may well become the model for many
other states, since ostensibly it attempts to deal with publicly recog-
nized problems while not imposing onerous obligations on members.
Under the plan the supreme court appoints an educational board of
thirteen members, some of whom may be non-lawyers." This board
has the power to (1) approve or disapprove CLE courses; (2) excuse
individual profession members from compliance with mandatory
requirements; (3) oversee methods for proving attendance; (4) make
particular CLE courses required as part of the mandatory programs;
and (5) report to the supreme court on member failure to comply
with mandatory requirements. Although the program has cosmetic
appeal, its capacity to deal effectively with the competence problem
seems disputable, since it only requires fifteen hours of course work
per year as contrasted with medical education programs requiring
150 to 200 hours per three-year period.
Mandatory CLE's, when combined with recertification pro-
grams, can ensure member exposure to important new material
without expensive program administration costs.87 However, expo-
sure by itself does not raise competence. Motivation to learn is
essential for improving the competence threshold. Normally, those
at the margins of competence have the least motivation to learn and
the programs have yet to deal constructively with this fact.s The
trend to locate CLE programs at resort entertainment centers seems
ill calculated to optimize the "will to learn". Specialization may
also impede interest in broad-based programs needed to attack
threshold incompetence,89 because such programs waste the time of
highly competent de facto specialists. Most important, however, is
the fact that the current species of continuing legal education seem
to be very inefficient in improving performance results, which are a
84. See, Byron, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education in Minnesota, 54 MICH. S.B.J.
361 (June 1975); Supreme Court of Iowa, Resolution of Feb. 13, 1974; see also, supra note 79
at 456.
85. See, Note, Continuing Legal Education, supra note 79, at 462.
86. See, Byron, supra note 84 at 361-362; and Parker, supra note 3, at 483.
87. Parker, supra note 3, at 478, argues that extensive investigatory procedures are
unnecessary to determine compliance with requirements. In the absence of evidence suggest-
ing misrepresentation, verified reports of attorneys should be accepted as correct.
88. Walkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 574 (May 1975).
89. Id. at 576.
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major cause of public dissatisfaction. The commercial courses that
use advanced technology to work directly on skill improvement may
be a partial answer, but the profession as now constituted appears
to have only limited capacity to acquire new skills as opposed to
absorbing substantive developments. Further, "skills" courses de-
mand considerable expenditures of time and money. Presently, the
profession does not seem willing to make such investments in con-
tinuing legal education.
4. Specialization, employed as a vehicle for insuring accepta-
ble quality of profession-member activity, is a double-edged sword:
The practice of the legal profession, both in the past and at the
present, is to license its members for life upon good behavior and,
by refusing to recognize specialties and specialization, to send
them forth as qualified generalists to serve the public. The profes-
sion thereby fosters before the public the myth of the continuing
competence and omnicompetence of the legal practitioner over the
life of his career. This practice persists in the face of the increas-
ingly technical and difficult nature of legal theory in every area of
law and of the fact that never before have legal reform and change
occurred at such a rapid pace.10
This specialization, of necessity, tends to segmentize the law and,
to some extent, emphasizes the mechanics of the law as distin-
guished from a broad sense of justice acquired from familiarity
with the legal problems of people of different walks of life in a
variety of situations."
Specialization's two-edge characteristic has stimulated ambivalent
application and acceptance. De facto specialization has long existed
within the legal profession," but the ABA has procrastinated, deny-
ing the official recognition of specialists that is a requisite for mak-
ing specialization an instrument of quality control. A special ABA
Committee on Specialization was estabished in 1967 to develop rec-
ommendations on the subject. 3 The majority report, produced in
1969, proposed restrictive guidelines and suggested that only a few
states experiment with specialization, "lest unnecessarily divergent
patterns become prematurely crystalized."94 The minority urged
90. Parker, supra note 3, at 463.
91. Hon. E. Warren, Law, Lawyers and Ethics: A Challenge to the Profession, 23
DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 635 (1974).
92. Chetham, Growing Need for Specialized Legal Services, 16 VAND. L. REV. 497, 499
(1963).
93. 93 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 141 (1968); Comment, Specialization: An
Overview, 6 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 453 (1975); see also, Cohen, Confronting Myth in the Ameri-
can Legal Profession, supra note 35.
94. Report of the Special Committee on Specialization, 94 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 249, 251 (1969).
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immediate nationwide implementation of specialization programs."
Two rationales may support legal specialization: one focuses on
problems of client access; the other focuses on lawyer competence.
The first theory views specialization as a unique vehicle for provid-
ing clients with efficient access to profession members having a
particular expertise. Optimization of client access necessitates min-
imizing requirements for member entry into a specialty field and
maximizing attorney willingness to both limit practice to the spe-
cialty and communicate that limitation to the public.
The second theory seeks to optimize competence through vehi-
cles analogous to the medical specialty board certification. Entry
into a specialty field is highly restricted by the use of extensive
educational requirements, testing requirements, and other screen-
ing devices to assure a high threshold of competence. These added
entry costs limit access to all but the sophisticated legal consumer
who desires special services, not because the problem falls in a par-
ticular area, but because he values the need for an exceptionally
well-qualified person and is willing to pay the price.
Three state plans implementing the special committee's guide-
lines provide an interesting contrast. 6 California, following the com-
petency approach, requires five years' experience in a specialty area,
some specialty education, a written and, in some cases an oral,
exam. 7 Mandatory recertification every five years requires a mini-
mum of ten years of experience and either specialized continuing
legal education or another examination. New Mexico's plan imple-
ments the "access" theory of specialization. Specialty certification
is accorded lawyers that have devoted over sixty percent of their
time to the specialty over the last five years. Consequently, there is
no direct evidence required concerning competence in the specialty.
Florida's plan gives some deference to both theories. Members may
obtain initial certification merely by asserting experience in the
specialty area. Recertification, however, requires completion of spe-
cialty education. Florida allows specialization in any general field
of law. New Mexico allows a broad specialization, while California
permits specialization in only three areas of law.
Despite implementation of the above plans, the sentiment
within the profession still seems strongly weighted against massive
95. Minority Report and Separate Statement, 94 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
255 (1969).
96. The states are California, New Mexico, and Florida. For a discussion see, Note,
Legal Specialization and Certification, 61 VA. L. REV. 434 (1975); and Note, Continuing Legal
Education, supra note 79. See also, Three Plans-A Summary for the Busy Lawyer, 48 FLA.
B. J. 168, 173 (1974).
97. See Note, Legal Specialization and Certification, supra note 96, at 452.
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adoption of formal specialization in substantive law fields." Several
specific arguments support this adverse sentiment. If substantive
specialization is permitted, there will be a tendency on the part of
all lawyers to develop specialities, particularly if advertising is
permitted. This is merely a reflection of the natural tendency on the
part of clients to opt for a specialist in lieu of a general practitioner,
all other things, including cost, being equal. A related problem
arises from the fact that the general practitioner subsidizes some
general practice activities with the more economically efficient spe-
cialized activities. If such specialty clients are siphoned off, he may
be unable to profitably confine himself to general problems despite
an interest in, and willingness to serve, such areas.
Once these forces for full specialization have run their course,
the profession will surely face the issue of how to deal with residual
general practice problems. The development of high sensitivity to
the dynamics of certain problems will naturally tend to dull sensi-
tivity to the significance of the differences between problems. Thus,
there may not be a balanced treatment of all important issues of
a particular client's case not clearly within the specialty area of his
lawyer. Issues falling outside the practitioner's specialty may be
ignored or at least underemphasized. Further, cross fertilization
of law fields may be diminished because specialization might tend
to limit the lawyers' capacity to draw analogies between trends in
other areas and trends in their own specialty.9 These specialty-
centered forces will erode "lawyer-like thinking", which depends
heavily on analogy development and a certain level of preoccupa-
tion with the client's problems as seen through the eyes of the
client rather than through the eyes of the specialty.0 0
98. See, Note, Legal Specialization and Certification, 61 VA. L. REV. 434 (1975) and
Cohen, Confronting Myth in the American Legal Profession, supra, note 35.
99. See, Warren, Law, Lawyers and Ethics, supra note 91.
100. See, Note, Legal Specialization and Certification, supra note 96, at 448. An exam-
ple of this failure of lawyer-like thinking was set forth in an article concerning the U.C.C.
The author found a "common casualty of specialization is the inability or failure of those who
concentrate on one subject to identify the involvement or relevance of another field to their
own activities. It has been the experience of this observer that lawyers who devote their
professional careers to the problems of the Commercial Code are not generally familiar with
developing principles in antitrust which might have an impact on their commercial law
counseling. Certainly this is understandable, for more often than not, the two fields do not
cross. But in 1967 the United States Supreme Court handed down a now famous antitrust
decision, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) which few then
recognized might have an impact drawing heavily from code cases.
In Schwinn, the United States Supreme Court stated that consignments coupled with illegal
price fixing were a per se violation of the Sherman Act, and further, that consignments used
for customer or territorial allocation but absent price fixing would also support a finding of
antitrust violation. Thus, one dealing only in a practice involving the U.C.C. may advise a
306 [Vol. 37
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 37 [1976], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/1
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
An obvious answer to this specialist-general practice dilemma
is recognition of general practice as a specialty. 10' This approach has
already been adopted by the medical profession, which recognizes
the generalist-family practice as a specialty.'"2 Bestowing a financial
award for specialization on general practitioners may tend to in-
crease the normal practitioner's competency. As this competency
increases the more time is spent analyzing client problems in prepa-
ration for possible referral to specialists, the general practitioner
will, in a sense, develop a specialty of choice.
The emphasis of substantive specialization would undoubtedly
encourage specialists within a field to develop unique mechanisms
for resolving contentious situations. A general decrease in resort to
courts may well result, followed by a decline in trial advocacy as a
skill separate from substantive specialty. This problem may have
partially prompted some leading jurists, including the Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court, to suggest that certification of
substantive specialties is premature.0 3 The decline of courts' im-
portance has long been a lurking nightmare for many leaders of our
profession. Even Roscoe Pound, a pioneer in sociological jurisprud-
ence, tended to turn his back on the development of administrative
law specialties, despite their functionality, for fear the trend would
openly subvert the court's autonomy and central function in order-
ing mankind's affairs. 04 No doubt the demise of the court's auton-
omy and importance in Nazi Germany did much to kindle such
thinking. From this perspective, specialization may indeed be pre-
mature, at least until such time as the profession has taken steps
to insure practitioner allegiance to the substantive and procedural
traditions underlying the courts.
For the court system to function properly, lawyers practicing
before it must have a high level of competence in procedure, evi-
dence, and courtroom performance skills. However, the question
remains whether such allegiance should be forced on all members
of the profession or merely held in highest regard by those specializ-
ing in trial advocacy. There are strong arguments to be made for
distinguishing between trial advocacy and substantive skills. The
client into an untenable antitrust violation. Dusenberg, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk
Transfers and Documents of Title, 26 Bus, LAW 1189-1192 (1971).
101. The Florida specialization plan allows an attorney to designate himself a specialist
in general practice. See, Three Plans, supra note 97, at 178.
102. Moser, An Anti-Intellectual Movement in Medicine? 227 J.A.M.A. 432 (Jan. 28,
1974).
103. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification
of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 62 FoRDHAm L. REV. 227 (1973).
104. R. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in
American Legal Historiography, supra note 5, at 32-38.
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virtues of the English system, which does make the distinction be-
tween solicitor and barrister, are frequently used by persons advo-
cating trial law as a specialty by itself. However, our admiration for
the British system should not obscure the fact that there are definite
advantages to be gained by maintaining the trial court tradition in
every lawyer, regardless of substantive specialty.
In this country the principle of separation of powers involves a
unique interrelationship between peoples and entities that is clearly
of American origin. Other countries may embrace a similar princi-
ple, but the interrelationships of people and entities supporting it
have distinctly different textures and origins. Thus, one must be
cautious in borrowing pieces of one for another. Conversely, one
cannot be wholly intransigent in making changes if allegiance to a
tradition is totally dysfunctional for the rendering of necessary serv-
ices to the consuming public. As actual litigation in the courts be-
comes a smaller and smaller portion of the average attorney's prac-
tice, it is appropriate to raise searching questions about allocating
a constant amount of limited resources to an activity of diminishing
utility. Only if one can assign to the tradition of courts an important
role in maintaining our form of government, in addition to the role
of serving individual clients, can the preeminence of the trial court
tradition be maintained.
5. Internal disciplinary activities of the law profession are re-
garded by many professionals and laymen as the primary bulwark
for coping with malpractice problems. They presumably detect and
punish professional incompetents, deter others from acts of incom-
petence, and give lawyers as well as laymen confidence that profes-
sion members are to be trusted by clients and colleagues alike.
Normally these activities are implemented through state and local
bar associations. In jurisdictions where bar association member-
ships embrace a large portion of the licensed profession, such
internal disciplinary activities could keep malpractice to the status
of an isolated occurrence. In situations where association member-
ship is only a fraction of those licensed, control of malpractice might
prove elusive. Theoretically, the increase in integrated bar associa-
tions, where membership is a requisite for practice, should make
internal disciplinary activities a central deterrent of malpractice.
Despite the logic suggesting the importance of disciplinary ac-
tivities by the organized bar, two different studies sponsored by the
ABA have found them to be, in fact, ineffective deterrents as now
implemented. The ABA Special Committee on Disciplinary En-
forcement (headed by Justice Clark) found state disciplinary
structures underfunded, understaffed, and narrowly defined.' 5
105. Clark Committee Report, supra note 18.
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State bars tend to limit disciplinary activities to complaint process-
ing and do not scan for incipient malpractice conditions or investi-
gate areas where there is smoke but no fire.'06 In essence, existing
disciplinary rules are not being effectively enforced.
An American Bar Foundation study criticizes state bar regula-
tory activities for other reasons. 0 Bar associations seem preoccu-
pied with unethical conduct, to the extent that they are occupied
at all with malpractice concerns. Disciplinary committees also fail
to uniformly regulate such unethical conduct even when detected.
Thus, many complaints of deficient attorney performance are sum-
marily dismissed as beyond committee jurisdiction because unethi-
cal conduct is not involved." 8 Until professional responsibility is
viewed with appropriate breadth, so that technical as well as moral
incompetence is actively sought out and treated, both state and
local disciplinary committees will continue to fail the trust others
have placed with them.
6. Licensing boards in most states currently screen candidates
for admission with an examination and moral character review;' 9
Montana and Wisconsin omit the examination for graduates of law
schools within their jurisdiction."0 Serious questions now surround
the efficacy of these entry screening techniques as vehicles for insur-
ing competence. Their utility to regulate the number of yearly en-
trants seems less in question. Because of the breadth of subject
matter covered by the profession, exams can only sample compe-
tence and must focus on simple analytical routines not representa-
tive of the complexity inherent in many professional activities. In-
creased use of the uniform bar examination may improve both the
quality of the questions and the quality of the grading,"' but it is
difficult to see such screening as now conceived ever becoming a
highly reliable mechanism for insuring competence. The moral fit-
ness screening seems to enjoy no better prospects, since the ap-
proaches now used, or those feasible with the manpower normally
available, have no statistical reliability."'
106. See, e.g., Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession, supra note
11, at 225 to 230.
107. See generally, MARKS & CATHCART, supra note 11.
108. Id.
109. See, NATIONAL BAR EXAMINATION DIGEST (1976 Edition); Before the Bar, State-by-
State Listings of Bar Requirements, (1976); See also, Note, Being of Good Moral
Character, 4 STUDENT LAWYER No. 9 at 47 (May 1976); Chapin, Scary, Ain't It?, 4 STUDENT
LAWYER No. 9 at 42 (May 1976).
110. West Virginia and South Dakota also omit examination of graduates from state
law schools within their jurisdictions. Additionally, many states have reciprocity agreements
(with varying conditions) which allow practicing members of another state bar to be admitted
without examination. See NATIONAL BAR EXAMINATION DIGEST, (1976 Edition).
111. Chapin, Scary, Ain't It?, supra note 109, at 42-49.
112. Note, Being of Good Moral Character, supra, note 109.
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Recently, mandatory course enrollment prior to examination
has been employed or advocated by some jurisdictions to improve
entrance competence, especially concerning trial advocacy skills."3
The logic behind such efforts seems to parallel that underlying spe-
cialists' certification. Unfortunately, there is little uncontroverted
evidence that such mandatory education correlates positively with
long-term competence in general practice."' Its proven value seems
restricted to highly focused areas of practice, and endures for rela-
tively short periods of time.
In summary, current license screening efforts have only ques-
tionable effect on maintenance of professional competence due to
their lack of depth and substantive focus, uneven administration,
and confinement to initial entry. Coordinating their use with educa-
tional prerequisites will do little to make such licensing a meaning-
ful deterrent of incompetence by professionals five years or more
into practice, especially in those areas undergoing significant
change.
V. LEGAL MALPRACTICE-IS PROFESSION ACTION ADEQUATE?
A. Empirical Assessment of Adequacy
To adequately discourage malpractice, professional activities
must deal effectively with specific acts of legal malpractice and
systematically eliminate the environmental elements that breed
recurrent malpractice. The profession's success in achieving these
two objectives is best assessed by examining the profession's pro-
cessing of all alleged incidents of malpractice and surveying various
constituencies to determine if the alleged incidents fully represent
all actual malpractice. Case analysis of actual processing should
reveal if there has been improper handling of any identified inci-
dents of malpractice. General surveys of layman contact with the
legal system should indicate whether malpractice complaints reflect
the full range of dissatisfaction with the profession and thus whether
current conceptions of malpractice are adequate. The profession's
failure to properly define malpractice is as much an inadequacy as
its defective handling of formal complaints of traditional malprac-
tice; clearly, the profession itself should be in the best position to
113. See, e.g., Cutright, Cutright, and Boshkoff, Course Selection, Student Character-
istics and Bar Examination Performance; and Beytagh, Prescribed Courses as Prerequisites
for Taking Bar Examinations, supra, note 30. See also, Agata, Admissions and Discipline of
Attorneys in Federal District Courts: A Study and Proposed Rules, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 249
(1975).
114. Cutright, Cutright, and Boshkoff, Course Selection, Student Characteristics and
Bar Examination Performance, supra note 30; see also, Pedrick & Frank, We are Faced with
a Clear and Present Danger, supra note 30.
[Vol. 37
32
Montana Law Review, Vol. 37 [1976], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/1
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
define its own performance specifications.
Some small empirical studies along the lines noted have been
undertaken, but their breadth and depth are inadequate to do more
than suggest that current profession activities are deficient." 5 Vast
financial and human resources are needed to execute empirical
studies adequate in dimension to establish the inherent value of the
scientific approach for accurately measuring professional inade-
quacy and discerning optimal avenues for improvement. A utiliza-
tion of the scientific approach without such a level of commitment
may be misleading, and result in an inefficient allocation of im-
provement efforts. Such an under-committed approach would be
reminiscent of the man who searched the vicinity of a street light
for his watch lost some distance away, because the illumination was
better under the street light than where he had lost the watch.
B. Heuristic Analysis of Adequacy
Heuristic study of professional malpractice and of the diverse
responses to it can provide a good overview of the inadequacy of
current profession activities in dealing with legal malpractice. With
this knowledge specific empirical studies can be fashioned to ex-
plore areas where the current deficiencies appear most severe and
the need for data to fashion improvement is most acute. The preced-
ing sections of this article reveal many similarities among the var-
ious professions' training activities, internal organization, mainte-
nance of identity, and relations with immediate clients. Parallels
also exist concerning techniques employed to maintain professional
competence, although there are significant differences in the effec-
tiveness of the techniques employed. Why, then, are there such
contrasts among the concepts for measuring competence? Discipli-
nary activities of lawyers focus primarily on normative notions of
conduct; those of doctors and accountants dwell on skills, methods,
and the results of professional activity as measured from several
perspectives. May the profession's preoccupation with normative
conduct, as the measure of threshold competence after admission,
be viewed as a major inadequacy?
The legal profession claims exclusive authority to assess the
competence of its members, and to discipline them in the event of
115. See generally Comment, Disciplinary Enforcement Problems and Recommenda-
tions: An Indiana Survey, 46 IND. L. J. 134 (1970); Note, Standards of Discipline for Attorneys
in Colorado and the Significance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 50 DENVER L. J.
207 (1973); Comment, Procedures for Disciplining Attorneys in Virginia, 29 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 439 (1972); Kane, Lawyer Discipline in Florida, 44 FLA. B. J. 522 (1970). See also
Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK
L. REV. 66 (1974); Commentary, Public and Professional Assessment of the Nebraska Bar,
55 NEB. L. REV. 57 (1975).
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incompetence. Presently the courts and the organized bar discharge
this authority.,,6 In most jurisdictions these disciplinary mecha-
nisms (1) are controlled by bar members, (2) emphasize procedural
informality and discipline by peer concensus, (3) function on a de-
centralized basis with most work done locally, (4) operate in relative
secrecy, (5) activate only upon receipt of complaints about specific
members, and (6) focus almost exclusively on member misconduct
or moral misbehavior." 7 Inherent in other professions are many of
these features, especially professional dominance of the disciplinary
process and the non-public nature of that process. Since a profes-
sion's social utility is directly affected by the public's confidence in
each profession member, member incompetence is best kept from
public view.
Despite similarities among professions, the legal profession is
unique in the level of interdependence among its members. In the
ordinary functioning of the legal system, the daily routines of indi-
vidual lawyers often involve other profession members such as op-
posing counsel and/or judges. In contrast to other professions, a
lawyer's effectiveness, regardless of task, is largely dependent on his
ability to anticipate the conduct of other members, many of whom
are relative strangers. It is also essential that the public believe that
profession members will conduct business among one another in a
manner consistent with the established principles of procedural due
process and other concepts of fairness. A logical means to a suitable
level of predictable behavior, among lawyers and between lawyers
and clients, is for the profession to focus its limited disciplinary
activities upon the necessary interpersonal conventions.
Unfortunately, many of these conduct rules reflect normative
values established by a few members rather than behavioral reali-
ties derived from the experience of all members."' Thus, substantial
resources of the profession must be allocated to ensure that mem-
bers internalize, or at least obey, these norms. Much of the member
acceptance of these values is engineered beyond public view by law
schools, but education is not enough. Some norm maintenance must
accompany the rendering of professional services. This maintenance
must be done in a manner that maintains public confidence by
minimizing the publicity of member behavior, which deviates from
the profession's rules of conduct.
Lawyers' preoccupation with conduct and secrecy about devia-
tions from conduct norms will become, if it is not now, the profes-
116. MARKS AND CATHCART, supra note 11, at 193-194.
117. Id. at 208-209.
118. See, e.g., Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a
Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L. R. 244, 254-262 (1968).
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sional inadequacy with the greatest impact beyond the profession.
The media's probing eyes and ears, coupled with its penchant for
instant analysis, are likely to expose the flaws in lawyer perform-
ance, skills, methods, and moral conduct. Exposure will enable lay-
men to make independent judgments about these flaws, especially
performance flaws which are easily observed and understood. It is
unlikely that the absence of a breach of a conduct norm will retard
the inclination of non-lawyers to publicly complain about a flaw,
sue for damages, or limit further reliance on the profession. Addi-
tionally, in the long term, publicity will discourage others from
relying at all upon the profession if alternatives are available.
Many factors now stimulate the public's awareness of flaws in
the profession's performance, and a concommitant desire for profes-
sional accountability. These include broad national coverage of
these flaws by all types of recognized media, and an increased level
of educational and intellectual awareness of laymen, ' 19 accompanied
by abundant comments on lawyers' techniques and strategies.'20
Recent examples of this coverage and analysis include local and
national scandals involving lawyers, such as Watergate, Montana's
Workman's Compensation investigation, the conflict of interest
scandal that embroiled Florida's supreme court, and the Homestake
Mining Company fraud in Oklahoma.
The natural evolution of government within the social structure
at the federal, state, and local levels will also change the nature of
public demands upon the profession. In a static, uncomplicated
society, the profession is primarily involved in the adjudication of
disputes on a case-by-case basis, and the lawyer's individual role is
a relatively simple one. However, a sophisticated industrial society,
permeated by government regulation and control of almost all com-
mercial and economic endeavors, places many additional demands
on lawyers that can easily overshadow traditional responsibilities.
In such societies there is great dependence upon legislation, which
contemplates extensive administrative regulation. Proper represen-
tation of individual and group interests in this context requires
lawyers to engage in scientific kinds of research, broadly analyze
problems, formulate intricate policies, and predict the probable ac-
ceptance and success of such policies in a highly sophisticated
system.' This broad-gauged role of the lawyer in society was well
119. F. Brewster, Professional Responsibility: The Lawyer's Task of Sisyphus, 54 MARQ.
L. REV. 180 (1971). As example of media coverage of flaws, see Special Report in U.S. News
and World Report (March 25, 1974) entitled, "America's Lawyers - A Sick Profession?"
120. An example of this analysis is the cover story of Time Magazine concerning the
defense of Patricia Hearst. Time, Feb. 16, 1976, at 96.
121. This idea is a paraphrase of a notion expressed in a book by E. L. Brown in her
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stated by the California supreme court in a recent case:
In a complex and interdependent society, human relations are even
being further fitted into a framework of legal rights and responsi-
bilities, and, in this process, the role of the lawyer has become
dependent upon him, his responsibility must be broadened and
deepened."'2
As the interface of statutory and regulatory enactments with society
becomes more complex, and access to proliferating data about the
interface more difficult, the probability of lawyer error in practice
substantially increases.
Improvement in the public's sophistication about the legal pro-
fession, and its increased reliance upon lawyers to cope with the
growing involvement of government in the public's affairs, will
prompt more strident demands for delivery of claimed expertise
concerning skills, methods, and performance as well as conduct
morality. If law schools continue to produce only traditional law-
yers, '3 whose training emphasizes substantive legal principles
rather than broader systemic analysis, claims of incompetence will
surely increase. Recent actions by jurists to impose specific training
requirements will do little to eliminate the stimuli for these com-
plaints, since the internal practices of the courts seem to be the
focus of such efforts, rather than expanding client needs. These
judicial efforts will thus deprive law schools of resources needed to
imbue law students with the broader perspectives required to oper-
ate efficiently in an administrative society, which is guided more by
principles of economic efficiency than by lawyers' notions of justice
and fairness. Consequently, professional education may be unable
to produce young lawyers that meet public expectations. Also it
seems clear that the profession has not assumed the responsibility
for ensuring that existing members comply with the public's expec-
tations. Several articles, including one by Marks and Cathcart enti-
tled Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self Regulation?,
provide a lucid taxonomy of profession failures in this regard.' 4
The Marks-Cathcart article notes that the process of "receiving
and acting on complaints-or failure to act on them-is the chief
way that the legal profession" approaches the post-admission task
of self-regulation. 5
discussion of the role of attorneys in the legislative process. E. L. Brown, LAWYERS, LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE at 205 (1948).
122. Neel v. Magna, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P. 2d 421, 98
Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
123. Supra note 116, at 236.
124. Reprinted from ILL. LAW FORUM No. 2 (1974), supra note 116.
125. Supra note 116, at 206.
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Thus the nature of complaints made against lawyers is crucial. So
too, are questions about who complains and who does not com-
plain. Lawyers rarely complain to disciplinary agencies about
other lawyers. Judges, too, are reluctant to complain to discipli-
nary agencies about either lawyer performance or lawyer conduct.
Instead clients most frequently supply the regulatory inputs. 2'
Most client complaints dwell on matters of performance, skill, or
method: such as lawyer oversight, procrastination, inept advocacy,
and excessive fees.'27 However, the agencies in the profession that
process these complaints employ principles and procedures focused
on moral misbehavior.
The inputs are client complaints which are primarily concerned
with performance matters of competence, diligence, and applied
skill. But the inputs are discounted because the disciplinary agen-
cies, perhaps the profession as a whole, believe clients are unable
to discern the proper or meaningful elements of the practice of law.
Thus the outputs tend to presume that the complaints may raise
only issues of lawyer misconduct or moral deviance.128
If grievance agencies search primarily for deviance in moral conduct
to determine the validity of client complaints of performance, there
seems to be little chance for objective performance standards to be
developed.'29
It seems logical that prompt profession development and en-
forcement of standards of skills, methods, and performance can
largely preclude spiraling consumer dissatisfaction. In most instan-
ces, such development and enforcement can be integrated with ex-
isting programs directed at conduct critical to the maintenance of
harmony among profession members. Should the profession fail to
seize the initiative in controlling incompetence, elements beyond
the profession will do so in a manner uncoordinated with the
profession's interests in member conduct.' The irreverance of law-
yers, HEW, and the FTC toward the medical profession's interests,
and SEC actions concerning CPAs are good examples of how outside
interests respond when professions procrastinate in internal reforms
needed to limit unnecessary harm to consumers of professional serv-
ices.
126. Id. at 207.
127. Id. at 217.
128. Id. at 226.
129. Id. at 228.
130. Part VII of this article discusses various ways for the profession to seize the initia-
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C. External "Regulation" as an Indirect Measure of Adequacy
1. General Comments
The inadequacy of internal regulation suggested by this heuris-
tic analysis and the few existing empirical studies can be corrobor-
ated by examining the extent to which various constituencies deal
with lawyer incompetence by resort to procedures not controlled by
the profession. This approach highlights the serious effects resulting
from inadequate profession procedures, thus providing the profes-
sion with a greater feeling of urgency to cope with the problem.
Unfortunately this approach does not disclose the broad range of
data necessary to fashion an effective response to these inadequa-
cies.
Public dissatisfaction with the quality control of professional
services through internal professional regulation is best illustrated
by recent events involving the medical profession.' 3 ' Incompetence
involving individual patients has generated an increasing number
of medical malpractice suits, which elicit the aid of forces outside
the medical profession. Groups of prospective patients, as well as
insurers of groups, have analyzed the provision of medical services
by various profession elements to assess quality and determine if the
conditions for rendering such services are equitable. The FTC, FDA,
HEW, and many other governmental entities acting on behalf of the
general welfare are constantly examining various elements of the
medical profession and formulating recommendations that tend to
externalize the regulation of professional competence. Although
there is great diversity in the external activities for dealing with
incompetence in the medical profession, patterns are developing
that suggest various interest groups affected by the profession favor
distinctive approaches for dealing with it on an external basis.
The legal and accounting professions have yet to experience the
same level of external interference with regulation of member com-
petence, perhaps because incompetence does not affect as many
people in such an obvious and intense way, and the apparent cost
of professional services is not nearly as great for all citizens. How-
ever, similar patterns of external response are now developing over
the provision of legal services. The rapid movement towards an
administrative society will accelerate this trend, as lawyers become
common buffers between people and the government at all levels.
131. Newspaper, magazines and journals are filled with articles about the medical
profession and the soaring costs of malpractice, brought about at least in part by the great
number of malpractice actions filed against physicians by disgruntled patients. See, e.g.
Sheehan, The Medical Malpractice Crisis in Insurance - How it Happened and Some Pro-
posed Solutions, FORUM, Fall 1975 at 80; Plant, The Medical Malpractice Crisis, UNIV. OF
MICHIGAN LAw QUADRANGLE NoTEs, Winter 1976 at 12; and TRIAL, May/June 1975.
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2. External Actions by Individual Clients
For many years individual clients dissatisfied with their law-
yer's performance have sought redress through litigation.'32 Com-
plaints against lawyers have been thrust into public prominence
because of two significant occurences: the events of Watergate and
notoriety concerning escalating medical malpractice costs. The
greatest attention surrounds legal services to corporate interests and
celebrities involving alleged misjudgment, lack of diligence in inves-
tigating the factual basis for opinions on legal matters, or fraud.
However, court reports disclose evidence of professional incompet-
ence concerning the interests of less illustrious clients.'33
A recent survey by a major insurance carrier lists four signifi-
cant groups of legal malpractice cases. Errors involving statutes of
limitations, missed appearances in court, misfiled documents, and
similar forgetfulness amounted to 45% of malpractice actions; errors
in legal judgment constituted 25% of the claims; 21% of the claims
were the outgrowth of unclear relationships between clients and
lawyers; and alleged fraud on the part of the lawyer amounted to
9% of the claims. 34
Forgetfulness undoubtedly prompts most suits, since its conse-
quences are clearly unnecessary, absent some intervening cause. 3 5
The probability of harm is great, while the burden of taking ade-
quate precaution to preclude such an occurrence is slight. In such
an instance a prima facie case of legal negligence exists. 13 There
132. See Rothstein, Lawyers' Malpractice in Litigation, 21 CLEVE. ST. L.R., May 1972
at 1; Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1959); Blaustein,
Liability of Attorney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19 BROOK. L. REV. 233 (1953);
Issacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CAL. L. REV. 39 (1935); Note, 63 COL. L.
REv. 1292 (1963).
133. State v. McElveen, - Mont. __, 544 P.2d 820 (1975), provides a good example
of this point. See discussion of this case below. 37 MONT. L. Rav. 387 (1976).
134. Luvera, Avoiding Legal Malpractice, CASE AND COMMENT Vol. 80, No. 5 at 3 (1975).
135. Cf. Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238, 1248 (1975).
136. Walker v. Porter, 44 Cal. App. 3d 1, 74, 118 Cal. Reptr. 468 (1974). The facts of
decided cases provide a perspective of the range of situations where professional self-
regulation proved inadequate in deterring oversight by professionals. In California a woman
injured in a fall caused by a construction trench had a prima facie case of legal negligence
when her attorney failed to bring an action against the contractor, the county or her landlord
within the time allowed by the statute of limitations. See also, Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128
N.J. Supp. 290, 319 A. 2d 781 (1974). In Louisiana a negligence action was allowed against
an attorney who failed to bring the plaintiff's workman's compensation claim within the one
year statute of limitations. Jackson v. Zito, __ La. -, 314 So. 2d 401 (1975). The failure
of an attorney to file a petition for discharge in bankruptcy was the basis for a California
negligence action. Feldesman v. McGovern, 44 Cal. App. 2d 566, 122 P.2d 645 (1941). An
old Montana case involving a lawyer's failure to appeal a case within the time allowed surely
would have been the basis of a negligence action had not one attorney absconded with the
client's money. State ex rel. Benton v. Baum, 14 Mont. 12, 35 P. 108 (1894).
Several cases involving default judgment provide further factual situations against which
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seems little reticence on the part of courts to impose liability, since
such cases are normally classic opportunities to apply the principle
of wealth redistribution based on fault. The failure to perform at
even a minimal level is obvious and no member of the judiciary
could condone forgetfulness at critical stages of the litigation pro-
cess without suffering public scorn.
Legal judgment is clearly one of the profession's most impor-
tant skills, and courts frequently respond favorably to clients who
have contracted for, but not received, such judgment from lawyers.
Many of these cases directly reflect the profession's ambivalence
toward standards for professional judgment, and its unwillingness
to employ internal regulatory resources to ensure that lawyers pos-
sess and competently exercise such judgment. The inadequacy of
self-regulation involves many different types of legal judgment.
Upon receipt of a case, a competent lawyer should recognize the
legal consequences of the facts presented by the client and investi-
gate those facts which seem critical.'37 Self-regulation fails to en-
force these professional obligations, and thus clients seek assistance
elsewhere. 3 ' Similar problems confront a client employing an attor-
claims of negligence involving forgetfulness can be assessed. In Pennsylvania, default judg-
ment was entered against a defendant because his attorney failed to answer the complaint.
Smith v. Tonon, - Pa. __, 331 A.2d 662 (1974). The attorney was even more negligent
when he failed to petition to open the judgment within the allowed time. Default judgment
was entered against a Michigan defendant when his lawyer, who was present at a meeting
setting a pre-trial conference, failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference. Kiilunen
v. Moodie, 55 Mich. App. 128, 222 N. W. 2d 303 (1974). A Colorado court denied the motion
to set aside a default judgment where an attorney was two days late in entering an appearance
because of his heavy schedule of appearances in litigation of other cases. The court denied
the motion despite the fact that it took notice of the attorney and his firm's large and
substantial practice and the heavy pressure the attorney was under at the time in question.
C. F. & 1. Steel Corp. v. Robb - Colo. __, 535 P.2d 491 (1975). Another Colorado case
described as "gross negligence" the acts of an attorney who, upon being granted an extension
of time to file an answer in an action for breach of contract, subsequently failed to answer.
Dudley v Keller - Colo. -, 521 P.2d 175 (1974); see also Temple v. Miller, 30 Colo.
App. 49, 488 P.2d 252 (1971). But in a Montana default judgment case the court reversed a
trial court refusal to open the judgment'when the defendant's attorney, who was a candidate
for office, simply forgot to make an appearance or answer the complaint because of the fact
that he was in the heat of a political campaign and canvassing for votes, Scully v. Babcock,
39 Mont. 536, 104 P. 677 (1909).
The plaintiff's wrongful death action on a California case was dismissed when counsel
failed to serve summons within three years of filing the complaint. Supra note 122. In Neel,
the plaintiff had hired counsel who associated with another firm as counsel of record and had
done so without informing the plaintiff. The original attorney had filed the action but neither
he nor the associated firm arranged for service of summons.
"Forgetfulness is not sufficient basis for vacating default judgment." Uffleman v.
Labbitt, 152 Mont. 238, 448 P.2d 690, 694 (1968). Consequently, in situations involving
forgetfulness it is unlikely that the attorney can escape the issue of liability.
137. Burien Motors, Inc. v. Balch, 9 Wash. App. 573, 513 P.2d 582 (1973).
138. A recent Montana case overturned the felony conviction of a Montana State prison
inmate partly because the defendant's attorney had failed to talk to any witnesses or investi-
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ney whose judgment is faulty, because of a failure to stay abreast
of legal development in his jurisdiction by reading advance sheets39
or by mastering the contents of state statutes and related cases.4 '
Apart from clients injured by non-diligent enforcement of pro-
fessional standards, there are others who seek external aid regard-
ing lawyers' failure to exercise commonly recognized professional
judgments yet to be incorporated in official profession standards.
The doctrine of informed consent between doctor and patient has
long been recognized,' 4 ' but clients often must resort to the courts
to obtain similar disclosures from their lawyers.'
Unclear relationships between clients and attorneys have gen-
erated several suits, which might have been avoided had self-
regulation ensured acceptable levels of member sensitivity to the
gate any facts beyond interviewing the defendant to obtain his version of what purportedly
transpired. State v. McElveen, supra note 133. In another Montana case, one involving a
default judgment, the court refused to overturn the district court judgment when the attorney
failed to ascertain the date required to answer. The court found the failure to discover
essential facts concerning the case was gross negligence. "We say gross negligence because
the only inference that can be drawn here is that the defendant neglected to inform counsel
of the date of service of summons, and counsel in turn neglected to inquire of defendant and
ascertain for himself the date of service." Robinson v. Peterson, 63 Mont. 247, 206 P. 1092
(1922). A similar question of judgment arose when counsel assumed an action against his
client was an ordinary ejectment action when it was, in fact, an action for forceful entry or
unlawful detainer. Counsel exercised poor judgment in not fulfilling his obligation to read the
summons and acting on the basis of false assumptions. Eakins v. Kemper, 21 Mont. 160, 53
P. 310 (1898).
139. Boss-Harrison Hotel Co. v. Barnard, 148 Ind. App. 406, 266 N.E. 2d 810 (1971).
140. Clinton v. Miller, 124 Mont. 463, 226 P.2d 487 (1951), implies that, at least in
Montana, an attorney must be familiar with statutes.
In a Michigan case an attorney's failure to attend a pre-trial conference because he
believed his attendance was required only if official notice was received, was viewed as
actionable when he had actual knowledge of the time and date of the conference. Kiilunen
v. Moodie, 55 Mich. App. 128, 222 N. W. 2d 303 (1974).
In Montana the court has held that a mistake at law "is not such a mistake under the
provisions of Rule 60 (6)(1), M. R. Civ. P. as will vacate a default judgment." Uffieman v.
Labbitt, 152 Mont. 238, 448 P.2d 690, 693 (1968). The liability of the attorney in such a case
may be twofold. Liability might exist on the basis of judgmental error; it is also likely to exist
because of "forgetfulness." The failure to exert the professional effort to minimize the proba-
bility of harm to the client at a time when the possibility of harm is great is likely to be the
basis of liability.
141. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 106 at 695 (4th Ed. 1971).
142. In Hendrickson v. Sears, - Mass. - , 310 N. E. 2d 131 (1974), the plaintiff
had retained the defendant attorney to search the title to real estate that the plaintiff in-
tended to buy. The attorney certified the title was valid, clear and marketable. The property
was purchased and later when the plaintiff attempted to sell the property, the prospective
purchaser refused to take it without modification because there was a recorded easement
running through the premises. The Massachusetts court said, "The attorney, like the doctor,
is an expert, and much of his work is done out of the client's view. The client is not an expert;
he cannot be expected to recognize professional negligence if he sees it and he should not be
expected to watch over the professional or to retain a second professional to do so. . . . The
attorney owes his client the duty of full disclosure of facts material to the client's interest."
Henrickson v. Sears at 135.
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persons' interests directly affected. Lawyers should realize that lack
of privity does not truncate the responsibility to safeguard the inter-
ests of a client's beneficiaries, "3 nor does legal advice rendered gra-
tuitously to an individual mitigate'44 the standard of care normally
applicable to paying clients. Court actions plainly reveal inadequate
profession standards, when the defendant-lawyers assert defenses
that reflect genuine surprise concerning the existence of professional
obligations to the clients harmed. Here moral misconduct is not
involved. What is involved is lack of knowledge and skill, more the
fault of the profession's ambivalence on standards rather than the
individual's lack of diligence in learning and applying established
standards.
Although lawyer fraud suits also evidence client dissatisfaction
with the conduct of a profession member, they are not caused by the
absence of internally developed standards or non-enforcement of
those standards, unlike suits involving other categories of lawyer
incompetence. Consequently, the existence of such suits is not a
convincing example of the inadequacy of self-regulation.
Malpractice claims by individuals, apart from reflecting dissat-
isfaction with current profession self-regulation, highlight the domi-
nant forces of malpractice. The limitations inherent in the members
as individuals seem to generate the greatest number of problems.
Professional training inadequacies may currently be responsible for
some problems associated with professional judgments and unsatis-
factory client-lawyer relationships. As the environment in which
143. The testatrix in Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1969), told the defendant attorney she wanted her entire estate to pass to her two daughters.
She did not want any of the estate to go to her soon to be second husband. The attorney
drafted a will which failed to mention the husband except to name him executor of the estate.
When the testatrix died, the husband successfully claimed part of the estate as a post-
testamentary spouse. The attorney was held liable despite the lack of privity with the daugh-
ters because "public policy requires that the attorney exercise his position of trust and
superior knowledge responsibly so as not to affect adversely persons whose right and interests
are certain and foreseeable." Heyer v. Flaig at 165. Another California case found an attorney
who erred in drafting a will could be held liable to a person named in the instrument who
suffered deprivation of benefits as a result of the mistake. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,
364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
144. The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia found an attorney liable
to a bank for gratuitous advice given to the bank concerning the security interest one of his
clients had in certain property. Security National Bank v. Lish, 311 A.2d 833 (1973). The
attorney's client had offered a partial interest in personal property as collateral for a twenty-
five thousand dollar loan. The attorney, an attorney of considerable reputation and experi-
ence, assured the bank the client was in a position to execute a second trust on the property.
As a result, the bank made the loan without a title search. A subsequent default on the loan
disclosed a pre-existing second trust which was superior to the bank's interest. The court held
"a lawyer scarcely may be held to a lesser standard of care simply because his inaccurate
representations (however innocently made) are conveyed to a non-client." Security National
Bank v. Lish at 835. The question of the attorney's liability was not reached in the reported
decision.
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lawyers serve clients becomes more complex, even more individual
client problems may be caused by inadequate professional training,
unless substantial changes are forthcoming.
3. External Actions by Group Interests
The profession has previously ignored its responsibilities to
large interest groups; thus prompting external interference with
self-regulation far more serious than a few malpractice claims. 14 5 For
example, it allocated few resources to service the underprivileged on
most civil and criminal matters before 1960. Although some profes-
sion initiatives concerning the underprivileged were forthcoming
during the '60's, they did not match the vigor of the profession's
claim of full concern for all. The government intervened to provide
legal services in civil matters"' and after Gideon"7 courts frequently
undertook to assign counsel in criminal matters. Subsequently, law
schools have sought to deal with this deficiency by changing curri-
cula emphasis, but the important point is that most initiatives were
externally conceived and implemented.
Manifestations of the profession's neglect of client groups and
beneficiaries of lawyer-client transactions have taken many forms.
Amid profession harassment, unions have sought to employ captive
lawyers to assure adequate and timely representation of individual
member interests. 4 ' Recently, a few lawyers have established legal
clinics without the profession's encouragement. Enterprising indi-
viduals outside the profession have fed the unattended interests
with a plethora of how-to-do-it-without-a-lawyer books and articles.
Finally, some groups and individuals have directly sought to embar-
rass the profession into action by disclosing areas of reckless profes-
sional disregard for client groups and beneficiaries.
The sources of these professional inadequacies are quite differ-
ent from those stimulating individual malpractice suits. Central to
the problem are the profession's inabilities to recognize or anticipate
the legal service requirements of specific subsets of the population,
to design mechanisms for providing the needed services, and to
ensure the effective employment of such mechanisms. Although
blame is not easy to fix, the structure of the practicing profession is
undoubtedly the focus of many of these inadequacies. The educa-
tional institutions have exacerbated the problem by being reticent
145. See Part II of this article.
146. E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM (1974).
147. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).
148. As examples of professional harassment, see United Mine Workers of America,
Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Association, 389 U. S. 217 (1967), and Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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critics and failing to identify and analyze the problems. Despite the
existence of adequate information and the resources for data collec-
tion and analysis, such insitutions often only begrudgingly develop
new human resources necessary to efficiently cope with these prob-
lems.
4. External Actions on Behalf of Society's Interests
Recent legislative activities concerning no-fault insurance and
divorce, administrative proddings for professional advertising, and
court decisions on the illegality of fee schedules might be viewed as
still further evidence of dissatisfaction within various constituen-
cies. However, these activities are better classified as reflections of
the profession's failure to adequately serve society's interests in effi-
cient and effective dispute resolution. Although law schools have at
times been inept and tardy architects of professional innovation,
and thus partially responsible for the necessity of such legislative,
administrative and court activities, the profession's structure is the
major source of existing inadequacies. Unfortunately the bar has
been more than nonfeasant in meeting these social needs. News
media, association journals, bar association resolutions, and govern-
ment hearing records chronicle the incessant efforts of the organized
bar to retard change from within or without. The motives underly-
ing these efforts are diverse and the merits of some changes are as
yet unknown, but neither of these observations can justify the pro-
fessional selfishness that sustains much of the active resistance to
change.
D. Profession Response to External "Regulation"
Despite the profession's responsibility for causing various con-
stituencies to seek external regulation regarding some types of mal-
practice, lawyers have also responded constructively to these mani-
festations of dissatisfaction. Thus it may be only a matter of time
before self-induced changes-that is, self-regulation-will reduce or
eliminate some inadequacies as seen from the perspective of one or
more of these constituencies.
Clients injured by fraudulent actions of profession members are
often eligible for reimbursement from bar association security
funds.'49 Unfortunately, client injury resulting from professional in-
competence is not similarly protected and there seems little support
from the bar for such litigants, even in deserving cases. 5 ' Fortun-
149. Clark Committee Report, supra note 18.
150. Some medical associations have sought to provide this support to wronged pa-
tients.
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ately, however, lawyers have not yet sought modification of the legal
principles governing the recovery amount, the statute of limita-
tions, '' or the right to litigate as the medical profession has done. 5"
Of course, as the frequency and amount of awards increase, lawyers
may seek modification of their own rules for selfish ends.'53
Recently, some elements of the profession have embarked on
ambitious programs to anticipate legal service needs of under-
151. This good fortune may be transitory. It appears that California, a state deeply
involved in the medical malpractice crisis, may be taking similar protective measures for the
legal profession. The California Assembly Judiciary Committee Chairman, Willie Brown, has
introduced A.B. 3068, reducing the statute of limitations from four years to three years after
the negligent act, not discovery of it, and one year after discovery. STUDENT LAWYER, May
1976 at 14.
152. The rising number of malpractice suits, particularly against members of the medi-
cal profession has caused insurance rates to rise drastically, threatening to make the practice
of medicine prohibitively expensive. Consequently, the medical profession has proposed a
variety of steps to reduce insurance premiums and to make insurance available to all doctors.
Ohio Strives to Resolve Malpractice Problems, 4 J. OF L. MED. 30 (Jan. 1976); Hirsh,
Malpractice Crisis: Fact or Fiction, 80 CASE AND COMMENT 3 (1975).
Several approaches have been adopted for restricting the rights of injured patients to sue.
11 FORUM 80 (Fall 1975). One involves curtailing the length of time a patient has to file suit -
usually specifying an absolute maximum. This is important since a major reason for the
increase in today's premiums is the unpredictability of amounts of recovery in future years.
In many states the statute of limitations does not start to run until the injury is or should
have been discovered. This gives tort claims an indefinitely long "tail" which makes it
extremely difficult to calculate future recovery amounts for presently issued policies.
Absolute recovery limits have been proposed and in several states enacted. The Florida
Medical Association, for example, proposes limiting recovery for death of an adult to $50,000;
for 100% permanent impairment to $50,000; and up to an additional 100% of the limit
imposed if willful or wanton gross misconduct is found. 11 FORUM 80 (Fall 1975).
Some proposals attempt to resolve tort claims either before they are formally filed or soon
after they are filed. The Michigan Medical Association for a time backed a proposal to allow
hospitals to require patients to sign an agreement binding them to settle any claims through
an arbitration board. 54 MICH. S.B.J. 355, 356 (1975). The association relented after receiving
strong criticism by the Michigan Bar, the United Automobile Worker's Union, and several
newspapers.
Other less stringent arbitration provisions have found more success. In Indiana, all
claims are required by statute to be investigated by a medical review panel composed of a
non-voting supervising attorney, a plaintiff expert, a defense expert, and a third expert
appointed by the other two experts. MEDICAL ECONOMICS, Jan. 9, 1975 at 29. The finding of
the panel is not binding but is admissible in court. In Montana, the medical association and
the State Bar have jointly created a review panel which claimants can consult if they desire.
36 MONT. L. REV. 321 (1975). The panel is composed of an equal number of doctors and
lawyers. The intent of providing the panel ostensibly is to provide expert analysis of an
injured patient's claim, hopefully helping a claimant obtain expert analysis which he other-
wise might be unable to obtain. If the panel finds the patient was injured through the
negligence of a physician, the panel will provide expert testimony at the trial. If, however,
the panel finds no negligently caused harm, the plaintiff's attorney is bound not to file suit
unless he is compelled in good faith to do so.
In Southern California, hospitals are attempting to use contracts for care which provide
for binding arbitration. 1 J. OF L. MED. 30 (May/June 1973). To avoid charges of unconsciona-
bility, the contracts stipulate that they may be rescinded within 30 days after treatment has
terminated. Very few exercise this option.
153. This matter is discussed supra note 151.
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represented groups and to design approaches for serving those
needs.' Many forms of prepaid legal services have been tried and
studied. Large segments of the population have been surveyed to
anticipate non-monetary impediments to optimal distribution of
legal services. Research has been undertaken to design more effi-
cient methods of distributing services in varied forms. Law school
curricula have grown much more responsive to new perceptions of
skills in short supply. Finally, concepts of permissible formats for
distributing services have broadened considerably, although there
still remains much resistance among segments of the bar. Despite
such progress much rigidity continues in the substantive and proce-
dural rules of the profession, impairing the interests of some client
groups. The profession's structure also delays the implementation
of meritorious changes.
Very few constructive approaches have been taken to correct
the profession's deficient responses to broad social needs. Almost all
external efforts for change are opposed by some sizable segment of
the profession. Little progress on this point is likely. Aside from
being insensitive to the profession's obligations to society generally,
many members view changes in the interest of the public as assault
on the central virtues of the legal system. Thus, externally imposed
change is the only way to modify the manner in which the profession
serves the public.
VI. MALPRACTICE-A CALCULUS FOR ANALYZING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. A Summary of Current Inadequacy
Current lawyer self-regulation does not ensure adequate mini-
mal standards for skills, methods, or performance. Even moral con-
duct standards are deficient as applied in many instances. The
resulting externalization of complaints by constituencies served by
154. A number of examples of affirmative programs are set forth in the ABA publication
ALTERNATIVES: LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, Vol. 3, No. 2, Feb. 1976.
The Camden County (N.J.) Bar Association's Lawyer Referral Service sponsors a weekly
column in twenty-one different local newspapers, entitled "Knowing the Law" and "It's the
Law." The column features a list of common legal questions and answers to those questions,
which are formulated by members of the bar. The column has successfully brought the
public's attention to the bar referral service.
The Harlem Lawyer's Association in New York sponsored two sidewalk legal clinics.
Tables, chairs, and a mobile unit were set up near a busy intersection in Harlem where
lawyers, assisted by law students, representatives of the phone company, the stock exchange
and the city university, offered free legal advice to passersby.
Legal counseling to the elderly recently was enacted as part of Public Law 135, the Older
Americans Act. The amendments require that at least 20% of the funds allocated to each state
under section 303(b) of the Act be spent on certain projects for the elderly.
The award of attorneys fees to successful litigants is being studied by a number of
governmental and ABA entities.
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the profession has not stimulated much improvement of self-
regulation except in a few instances. Thus, the profession has not
captured the initiative in developing standards for skills, methods,
or performance. The profession even seems to be losing control of
some of its conduct standards to external groups, which advocate
standards for skills, methods, and performance that are not fully
compatible with the profession's moral conduct standards.'5 Efforts
to reverse this trend are growing, but they seem ill-conceived.
Some within the profession, observing this slippage of self-
control through inadequate self-regulation, advocate nearly total
revision of ethical codes and enforcement procedures to effect more
stringent moral standards within the profession. Bar grievance com-
mittees are urged to diligently pursue all conduct breaches, to in-
form all interest groups of their existence, and to disseminate infor-
mation concerning their activities. Further, proposals suggest that
local Bar advisory groups be established to monitor the general level
of member conduct in a given legal community. Unfortunately, this
approach continues to dwell on matters of little importance to the
three main constituencies. Their complaints will continue until, and
unless, self-regulation produces a substantial improvement in law-
yer performance.'56
Various state and federal courts on their own motions have
recently asserted more control over the profession and attempted to
extend control over professional schools to quell outsider dissatisfac-
tion.' 7 This control is through mechanisms such as prescribed law
school courses,'58 board certification for entry, periodic recertifica-
tion, specialization certification, and continuing legal education.
155. For example, see: Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising: A Moderate Proposal; ALTERNATIVES:
LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, Vol. 3, No. 2 at 3, Feb. 1976; and an article entitled, "Closing
in on the Professions" in Business Week, Oct. 27, 1975 at p. 106.
156. Supra note 116, at 207.
157. Qualifications for Practice Before the United States Courts in the Second Circuit,
67 F.R.D. 159; Burger, Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification
of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973); Bazelon,
The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Kaufman, The Court Needs
a Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 175 (1974); New Admission Rules Proposed for Federal District
Courts, 61 A.B.A.J. 1385 (1975); Kaufman, A Response to Critics of the Second Circuit
Admission Rules, 61 A.B.A.J. 1514 (1975).
158. The Second Circuit Subcommittee to review law school curricula recommended
thirteen courses as either essential or desirable for efficient advocacy, as well as five addi-
tional courses which they considered important but nonessential for efficient advocacy. The
consensus of the full committee was that there were certain courses without which the proba-
bility of competence in advocacy was extremely remote. The essential courses are: 1)
Evidence; 2) Civil Procedure, including Federal Jurisdiction, Practice and Procedure; 3)
Criminal Law and Procedure; 4) Professional Responsibility; and 5) Trial Advocacy. 67
F.R.D. 159, 168. For contrary views, see: Boscoff, Course Selection and Rule Thirteen in
Indiana, 27 J. LEG. ED. 127 (1975); and Pedrick & Frank, We are Faced with a Clear and
Present Danger, LEARNING AND THE LAW, (Winter 1976).
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Although such efforts will no doubt reestablish the judiciary's tradi-
tional preeminance within the legal fraternity, they fail to attack
directly the problems outsiders seem to have with the legal system.
These judicially-imposed screening mechanisms will decrease the
probability of poor performance by raising the general threshold of
"tested" competence. However, this probability cannot be brought
anywhere near zero without forcing a "Wall Street" lawyer on all
consumers, along with the associated costs. If such screening ap-
proaches are employed, many needs of various interest groups now
satisfied by "marginal-probability" lawyers will go unsatisfied, be-
cause these lawyers will be screened out. Consequently, an even
greater percentage of the public will lack legal services.'59 Further,
such screening machinery possesses little capacity to discriminate
between the needs of the three constituencies. Even if some prob-
lems of individual clients could be reduced through specialization
or recertification, such measures are at best crude tools for eliminat-
ing the dissatisfaction of either the client groups or the broad social
interests.
Preoccupation with intra-profession relations and the needs of
individual clients has been a hallmark of self-regulation, ineffective
as it may be. Yet, in an administrative society the profession's chief
role should be tending to the needs of groups and the general social
welfare. If self-regulation fails to deal directly with deficiencies in
serving this role, external regulation will be imposed or the profes-
sion's functions regarding these interests will be curtailed.
B. Relevant Factors for Improving Adequacy
Assuming that the profession wishes to avoid such adverse con-
sequences, it is essential that self-regulation efforts be redesigned to
accommodate the needs of these interests as well as the traditional
needs. However, such accommodation must be achieved with finite
resources. Thus, efforts must be carefully coordinated not to work
at cross purposes with one another, and such efforts must be focused
on those areas where the greatest probability of harm exists.
A starting point for meeting these objectives is the development
159. The last decade has produced numberous studies of various population subsets
that have limited access to legal services. Minorities have received greatest attention, but
substantial work has also been done to identify the level of legal representation for low income
families generally. For example, see Lochner, No Fee and Low Fee Legal Practice of Private
Attorneys, 9 LAW AND Soc. REV. 431 (1975). There is also considerable research on what the
profession does once inadequate representation is disclosed. See E. JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND
REFORM (Russell Sage Foundation, 1974). During the last three years considerable data has
also been collected on the inadequacy of legal representation of middle class families concern-
ing various types of legal issues. See CURRAN AND SPAULDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC
(ABF, 1974).
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of a single calculus that can be used to identify the legal practice
conditions where the greatest harm from legal incompetence, in
terms of number of incidents or impact per incident, is likely to
occur for each of the elements affected. The variables for such a
calculus should ideally be common to most legal undertakings of a
given profession-member on behalf of one of the three constituencies
previously discussed. Four elements common to all legal undertak-
ings are: (1) a lawyer, (2) a specific legal task, (3) a client or interest,
and (4) an environment in which the first three interact.
Many characteristics of a lawyer, or group of lawyers, may af-
fect the quantity and quality of harm the lawyer is likely to visit
upon a client, a client class, the profession, or society in general.
Among these characteristics are intellect, number of cases or trans-
actions supervised in a given time period, and amount of experience
concerning particular classes of transactions. Greater intellect, es-
pecially when novel or complex tasks are involved, should correlate
with a lower probability of harm. As transaction density increases
to high levels, the probability of harm should increase. Increased
experience should reduce the probability of harm, allow the transac-
tion density to increase, or intellect to decrease, without increasing
the probability of harm.6 0
Legal tasks can be classified in many ways, but for purposes of
predicting harm the factors of level of complexity, degree of detach-
ment from common sense or experience, and the disparity involved
between law on the books and law in action are especially salient.
The more complex an issue or task, the greater the likelihood that
some aspect of it will be mishandled. Mishandling is also more
likely as the degree of the law's detachment from common sense, or
the disparity between the law on the books and the law in action
increases.'
The client's sophistication and the complexity of his needs are
160. The concepts of apprenticeship and internship were developed in large measure
out of recognition of the interrelationships between experience and competence. Several years
of experience in the courtroom or real estate closing office substantially reduce the probabili-
ties that critical steps in the trial or closing process will be overlooked, regardless of a lawyer's
intellect. Without such experience, preparation time for a single case must necessarily be
higher to avoid negligent omissions. As experience increases, such preparation time can be
substantially reduced and thus the number of transactions handled during a set period
increased.
161. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §651 et seq.,
is one of the most publicized examples of a law whose scope of application and implementing
rules are viewed by many as often contrary to common sense. Thus, rendering advice to
clients regarding OSHA can be a perilous enterprise for lawyers, especially in light of the
organization and specific wording of the numerous regulations. Similarly, rendering advice
based upon literal interpretations of statutes and ordinances can prove embarrassing since
many valid statutes are in fact seldom or never implemented. The folklore of every town and
state embodies its own list of such laws.
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major factors of the client element, which affect both real and per-
ceived harm. Sophistication affects an interest group's initial expec-
tations concerning the lawyer's services, its ability to recognize in-
competence, and its capacity to assess the full consequences of such
incompetence. Similarily, increased complexity of the client's com-
position makes it more difficult for the lawyer to sense the client's
real needs regarding the legal task. This, in turn, can impair com-
munications between the lawyer and the client and make optimal
resolution of the problem more elusive. '62
The environment is the forum in which the legal transaction
takes place, or the circumstances under which the lawyer does his
work. Many elements of the forum affect the incidence of incompet-
ence, but level of formality, or sophistication of purpose, are possi-
bly of greatest importance. The most obvious dichotomy is that
between the federal courts and the municipal courts. (However,
distinctions between courts, legislatures, and administrative enti-
ties, and between rulemaking and adjudication within an agency
ought not to be ignored.) It is commonly assumed that the federal
courts subject the lawyer to greater scrutiny and higher practice
standards, because of the caliber of the other lawyers engaged in the
same transaction. Further, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
favor a substantial level of preparedness. Conversely, municipal
courts favor simplicity rather than preparedness to accommodate
the individuals in the process, and lawyers are not held to high
substantive and procedural standards. If one views environment in
terms of formality, a higher incidence of incompetence will likely
appear in formal settings if all lawyers access the forum. However,
in reality formality tends to screen out incompetent lawyers. If this
factor is recognized, the level of actual incompetence of representa-
tion is likely to be highest in an informal setting.
C. A Framework for Relating Factors to Anticipate Inadequacy
Each of the four elements discussed above has its greatest pre-
dictive value when a circumstance involves an extreme example of
that element. However, an extreme case involving one element by
itself will seldom justify a prediction of malpractice or incompetent
activity. Only by evaluating a practice situation in terms of all four
162. Many administrative law attorneys in Washington, D.C. are retained by law de-
partments of major corporations to represent corporate interests before specific federal agen-
cies. The relationship between the "client" and administrative lawyer is highly defined and
there is little opportunity for malpractice to occur. Conversely, a lawyer involved in a bitter
domestic relations dispute may often find it difficult to ever define his relationship with the
client and identify the hierarchy of the client's interests in the dispute. This instability can
easily foster conditions that generate malpractice.
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elements can a meaningful prediction of malpractice be made.
Since all elements are common to most professional transac-
tions involving outsiders, attaching a relative value to each element
should not be difficult. Then the elements can be combined to ob-
tain some composite assessment. To illustrate this composite as-
sessment, the four elements can be depicted as four equal length
lines radiating from the same point at right angles to each other.
The lines are scaled from zero to ten, with the ten located at the end
of each line and representing the highest probability of incompet-
ence regarding that element. The value scaling on each of the lines
is not uniform for every line, but is logarithmic depending on the
element to which the value is attached. 3 For any particular fact
situation or class of situations, a point can be located on each line
representing an assessment of eaeh element. Then, the lines can be
connected to form a four-sided figure. When the area within this
figure is large, it reflects a high probability of incompetence. A small
enclosed area implies a low risk of malpractice or incompetence. For
example, assume a recent law school graduate with modest intellec-
tual ability establishes his own practice in New York City and first
seeks to defend a banking corporation in an antitrust action. The
display of the four elements involved suggests a high likelihood of
malpractice.
Degree of Informality
and Absence of Profession
Peers
Degree of Lawyer Deg ee o.
Incapacity Concerning Degree of
Intellect and/or - -_ 0 - =10 Task Complexity
Lxperience I
Degree of Lack of
Constituency Sophistication
and Knowledge Concerning
Professional Service Rendered
163. The use of "logarithmic" here is not intended to imply mathematical accuracy; it
is merely intended to be graphic illustration of relative unit values.
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By using this crude calculus, it should be possible to identify
situations with a high risk of incompetence for any lawyer/
constitutency/task/environmental mix.'64 Further, by holding all
elements constant except the constituency, it is possible to examine
how various high-risk situations for one constituency might impact
on the others necessarily involved. This information should eventu-
ally permit evaluation of various solutions to identify the one which
produces the greatest reduction of risks for all interests with the
least resource commitment or change." 5
Apart from identifying the problem areas and their relative
impact on various constituencies, the calculus can be employed to
evaluate how changes in other elements can affect malpractice
probability concerning specific interests. For example, court struc-
tures and procedures can be varied to determine change in effect
upon malpractice probability. This information can then be corre-
lated with associated costs in time, dollars, and human resources.
Once the optimal procedures are identified, the task and client ele-
ments can be varied to determine the range over which the proce-
dures will satisfactorily retard incompetence.
In a more complex vein, possible simultaneous changes in two
or more elements can be analyzed to identify combinations of
changes, which over time would most quickly or efficiently reduce
the probabilities of incompetence in specific practice areas. This
might reveal that certain corrective measures must be applied to
more than one element at a time in order to achieve optimal results
with minimal resources. 66
There are many improvements that can be made on the calcu-
lus to enchance its quantitative capacity. However, the number of
164. If the calculus is used to survey the potential of malpractice in many different
situations, it will obviously be necessary to vary the precise factors reflected by each axis.
For example, in one situation it may be best to have the client axis reflect level of sophistica-
tion concerning the legal task involved while in another situation the axis should reflect the
complexity of the client's make-up.
165. Much current legal analysis advocates that improvements to one group's interests
be evaluated in part with reference to the impact such improvements will have upon the
interests of other groups. Although this approach has great merit, there are problems with
this utilitarian approach which are nicely discussed in Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
166. For example, in certain tax practice areas undergoing rapid change CLE and
recertification requirements can significantly reduce incompetence resulting from practition-
ers not keeping up-to-date. However, if many area developments are characterized by in-
creased complexity rather than mere change, CLE may not help practitioners who have
limited capacity to operate in complex technical environments. Consequently, further reduc-
tion of incompetence probabilities may require simplification of tax provisions or some spe-
cialization within specialties. Another approach might focus on screening out such "limited
capacity" practioners, but this may not be possible in law areas involving clients both in low
as well as high density population areas.
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elements in the calculus should not be expanded much beyond four.
If new elements were added, so many permutations would be in-
volved that the calculus' utility to decision-makers would be mini-
mal. If the calculus remains fairly simple, decision-makers can eas-
ily keep all the factors in mind."'
The following section demonstrates ways the calculus might be
employed in different situations to measure probabilities of incom-
petence and to evaluate proposed approaches for reducing or elimi-
nating such incompetence.
VII. MALPRACTICE-DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE APPROACHES
A. Analysis of Some Client Problems and a Suggested Solution
Numerous legal transactions involve only lawyer and client.
Advice is given, documents are prepared, and decisions are made on
the basis of such advice and documents. Most lawyer involvement
is routine and the impact of the lawyer is rather narrow; few beyond
the client are interested or affected. Further, most clients have little
sophistication regarding the transaction's legal aspects and do not
have repeated contact with a lawyer. Finally, the enviornment asso-
ciated with the transaction is often extremely informal. There are
few prescribed procedures and little involvement of other profes-
sionals. Thus, if such a transaction is graphically depicted according
to the calculus it would appear as follows:
167. Although it is essential for simplicity to limit the number of elements in the
calculus, this does not preclude consideration of attributes each element connotes when
plotting a value on an axis. For example, when considering the lawyer element, sub-elements
which may be important are such characteristics as (a) intellect, (b) experience, (c) specialty,
etc. The same procedure can be applied to each of the remaining elements by dissecting the
element into its pertinent sub-elements.
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The interesting feature of these transactions with respect to the
environment and client axes is that the probability of malpractice
seems high, whereas the lawyer and task characteristics portend
only limited probabilities of incompetent actions. It is logical to
assume self-regulation is most effective when the greatest risk exists
on the lawyer and task axes. These measure competence, and com-
petence is subject to direct control by the profession. Conversely,
self-regulation would appear least effective when the risk is caused
by high values on the environment and client axes. Factors which
affect values on these axes are not controlled by the profession.
Further, high values reflect incapacity to even detect malpractice,
thus the profession does not know when malpractice occurs in order
to react in some fashion. The validity of this observation is most
evident when the calculus is applied to disciplinary or admission
proceedings where the courts are involved and the profession might
be viewed as the client. Such a situation could be illustrated as
follows:
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Remedies for malpractice on these matters are clearly available
through self-regulation.
Apart from the implications for self-regulation, the calculus
suggests several other matters of importance. First, when the area
within the lines is relatively great, the probability of incompetent
actions is large enough to warrant attention. Second, incompetence
will primarily involve deficiencies in performance and moral con-
duct rather than in skills and methods, since the tasks are uncom-
plicated and lawyer experience is presumably adequate for such
tasks.
Despite the lack of client sophistication about these transac-
tions, there can be little doubt that the forces noted in sections V(B)
and V(C)(1) will enable them to perceive deficiencies in perform-
ance whether resulting from fraud, oversight, or some other cause.
Further, such deficiencies will often prompt the client to seek re-
dress. The mechanisms made available to such clients should ide-
ally permit efficient redistribution of wealth to compensate for inju-
ries suffered, to insure satisfaction of the legal consumer, and to
discourage recurrent deficiencies in the profession.
There are three basic alternatives available to resolve this two-
fold goal: (1) the profession disciplinary process; (2) court control
of the bar; and (3) client suits. The discliplinary process has not met
the first objective of client redress, and for reasons previously dis-
cussed seldom accomplishes the second. An exception regarding
redistribution may exist where some malfeasance has been perpe-
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trated by the lawyer,' such as fraud or absconding with client
funds, and the client protection fund is relied upon to provide at
least partial relief to the wronged client.'69 Here the redistribution
goal is at least partially met. However, the Clark committee recom-
mended that "payment from the fund would be made only after
judicial determination that the loss had been the result of attorney
misconduct", 7 ° and that a limitation be placed "on the amount a
single individual can collect from a client security fund".,', Thus,
even in cases of payment under these arrangements the redistribu-
tion goal is significantly limited.
The present emphasis of greater court control over the practic-
ing bar is also deficient in meeting the twofold goal of performance
regulation and redistribution of wealth. Redistribution is totally
ignored. Although this conceptual notion of regulation attempts to
influence the thinking of lawyers about deficient performance, it
fails. Court control of performance focuses on performance in legal
forums, which the calculus indicates are not normally involved in
the deficient performances under discussion.
Suits by clients against lawyers who have not performed com-
petently represent the third alternative to the twofold goal. There
are a number of theories upon which action against an attorney can
be brought; some viable, some untried. Almost every legal malprac-
tice action can be "said to partake of elements both ex contractu
and ex delicto. .... "I72 The primary vehicle for redress is negli-
gence, but other actions based on contract or perhaps the Uniform
Commercial Code's express and implied warranty of sale provisions
might lie. 73 Lawyers' fees might be questioned on the basis of unjust
enrichment. This, in turn, might lead to a quantum meruit basis of
payment.' The measure of damages would differ depending upon
the election of remedies and the theory of action.'75 The facts of a
particular action may preclude one or more theories of legal mal-
practice, but that is a matter of practical judgment.
Of the suit alternatives available, negligence seems the most
168. State ex rel Benton v. Baum, 14 Mont. 12, 35 P. 108 (1894).
169. Supra note 149, at 189.
170. Id. at 191.
171. Id. at 190.
172. Jackson v. Zito, - La. -, 314 So.2d 401, 404 (1975).
173. This is not an accepted theory but is raised in the court's discussion of the scope
of the U.C.C. in Newark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
174. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), found fixed fee schedules
impermissible. An alternative to fixed fees might be the value of the work done. Such a
scheme of remuneration would presumably place a premium on quality work. In a seller's
market the value of the product may well induce the buyer to pay the kind of fees such a
notion imnip The co t is nalogous to the corporate house counsel notion.
175. Harding v. Bell, 265 Ore. 202, 508 P.2d 216, 217 (1973).
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logical for achieving full redress and deterrence. An action for negli-
gence arising from the activities of an attorney is not fundamentally
different from other, more typical actions for negligence.' 6 The ele-
ments of a legal cause of action for negligence are: (1) the duty as a
lawyer to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members
of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach
of that duty; (3) proximate causal connection between negligent
conduct and the resulting damage; and (4) actual loss or damage
resulting from the attorney's negligence.'
The duty element of the case involves two major subparts: the
standard duty which the lawyer owes clients in general, and. the
nature of the duty owed to the specific client involved in the action.
For the first subpart of duty, the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2D. sup-
ports the locality rule for determining the standard of care to be
applied. The RESTATEMENT indicates that:
One who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profes-
sion . . . is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally
possessed by members of that profession . . . in good standing in
similar communities. 7 8
A number of states have adopted the locality rule, requiring a law-
yer to "exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence which is
exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his locality.' 7 Other
states use a standard of care based on the skill and diligence exer-
cised by lawyers within the state. This approach is reflected in the
Montana case of Clinton v. Miller where an attorney title examiner
was held to a standard of familiarity with "the statutes and deci-
sions of his own state, and he must apply settled rules of law that
should be known to all conveyancers."1 0
The assessment of the second subpart, a lawyer's duty to spe-
cific clients, is a more complex matter. Judge Learned Hand, in
United States v. Carroll Towing Company,'"' indicated that three
variables must be taken into account in establishing this aspect of
duty. Although the case involved the duty of a barge owner, it can
easily be applied in the context of a legal malpractice action. Stated
as such, a lawyer's duty to provide against resulting injuries to a
176. Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
177. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, p. 143 (West, 1971).
178. RESTATEMENT (2D) OF TORTS §299A (1965).
179. Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (M.D. La. 1973);
Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972); Calandro
Development, Inc. v. R.M. Butler Contractors, Inc., - La. App. -, 249 So. 2d 254
(1971).
180. Clinton v. Miller, 124 Mont. 463, 226 P.2d 487, 498 (1951).
181. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
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client would be the function of three variables: (1) the probability
of harm to the client if a lawyer with particular capacities under-
takes a specific legal task in a particular environment; (2) the grav-
ity of resulting injury to the client; and (3) the burden of taking
adequate precautions to protect the client's interests by reducing
the probability that the harm will occur. The calculus can be used
to establish a value for the first variable in a particular situation.
Assignment of values to the second two variables is extremely diffi-
cult, but probably should be guided by the following principle:
As the number of alternatives in what can possibly be done on the
client's behalf narrows, with a concomitant decrease in alternative
approaches if the first choice is incorrect, the probability of harm
to the client if the attorney is negligent increases. Thus, while the
standard applied to the attorney's conduct at various stages of the
transaction is the same, that of a reasonably prudent attorney
exercising the care, skill, and knowledge of members of the profes-
sion, a greater burden of precaution in expected performance exists
as each step in the proceeding becomes more critical to the client's
cause.
Although this type of formulation is complex and requires careful
application, both the profession and the client require such incre-
mentalization of duty. Negligence actions for lawyer malpractice, as
they are now conducted, allow juries of laymen to be guided solely
by instructions employing the nebulous standard of the "reasonable
and prudent attorney". Thus, a defendant attorney is subjected to
the layman's broad discretion in interpreting this standard.
The profession could analyze various broad legal subjects and
identify distinctive stages of the lawyering process within such sub-
jects. These stages could then be related to specific legal activities
deemed necessary to properly serve normal client interests asso-
ciated with such activities. In essence the profession, through inter-
nal activities, could articulate the requisite standard of performance
for the stages of any legal transaction. The profession would thus be
able to transform the broad discretion of the jury into a form of self-
regulation by the bar.
Once the dimensions of the duty element of the negligence case
have been established, the issue of breach of that duty can be re-
solved without great difficulty. However, if the duty issue is not
properly dissected, establishing a breach can become an extra-
ordinarily messy problem. Admittedly, in an uncontested case, such
as drafting a will or preparing a contract, lack of success in achiev-
ing the client's objectives may in itself be conclusive evidence of
breach of a duty if the lawyer undertook the task without caveat.
H.owever, in contested cases, success cannot be the measure of
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breach of duty, since the transaction necessarily involves lack of
success on behalf of one of the two clients. In such instances the
lawyer can only be held to perform in a reasonable and diligent
manner; not to be a guarantor of results."2 Thus attention must
again shift back to a proper definition of duty.
The elements of proximate cause and damages, which are also
critical to a legal malpractice case, present as many problems as
duty and breach of duty. However, these problems seem to be great-
est where contested issues are present.8 3 In uncontested situations,
the problems are much less severe and the negligence action is a
rather efficient tool.
If legal malpractice actions are encouraged as the vehicle for
dealing with incompetent legal performance in uncontested situa-
tions, one problem still remains. In the absence of the profession's
establishment of rather detailed standards, most of the critical is-
sues in the case will be decided by the jury rather than the judge.
Consequently, if there develops within the public a general dissatis-
faction with the legal profession, it can be expected the jury will be
harsher on individual lawyers than is justified under the particular
circumstances of a case. Such individual lawyers would be bearing
an unfairly large part of a burden better placed on the profession
as a whole. Obviously the only way to resolve this problem is for
the profession, through internal procedures, to develop standards
that have the effect of depriving the jury of great discretion, while
at the same time making it easier for the jury to properly assess
liability in cases where lawyer malpractice is evident.
B. Summary Analysis of Client Groups and a Suggested Solution
The representation of group interests can involve the whole
spectrum of legal principles, institutions, mechanisms, and legal
personnel. Unrepresented interests may seek initial representation
among law students, thereby hoping to stimulate production of legal
personnel qualified and interested in serving their needs.'84 Other
182. Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164, 167 (1958).
183. In Feldesman v. McGovern, 44 Cal. App. 2d 566, 112 P. 2d 645 (1941) the court
held that the plaintiff in a malpractice action must plead and prove that attorney perform-
ance of the negligently omitted act would have clearly produced benefits for the plaintiff.
Satisfying such a burden of proof could be difficult if lawyer action did not automatically
entitle the plaintiff to specific benefits. Conversely, the burden would be easily met in situa-
tions where timely filing of a tax refund request would automatically entitle the plaintiff to
a refund.
184. Legal aid clinics in many law schools have existed for decades to provide students
with some practical experience and extend limited legal services to groups and individuals
unrepresented due to financial deprivation. During the late sixties these programs emerged
as a major contender for law school instructional resources. See generally E. KITCH, GOALS,
MODELS AND PROSPECTS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1970); Gorman, Clinical Education:
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unrepresented interests may rely on an experienced lawyer to mobi-
lize their members into a cohesive unit to enhance their position vis-
a-vis other highly represented groups.85 Group interests presently
represented may elect to switch the legal forums or substantive
bodies of law relied upon to obtain adequate recognition of their
interest. 6 The list of such groups could be enlarged, but these ex-
amples indicate that if the full range of group interests is illustrated
according to the calculus, no definite patterns would exist concern-
ing any of the four elements. The level of client sophistication would
A Prospectus, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 537 (1971); Redlich, Perceptions of a Clinical Program, S.
CAL. L. REV. 574 (1971); Pye, Clinical Education in the Law Schools, 39 BAR EXAMINER 9
(1969). Financial and emotional encouragement for the growth came from several organiza-
tions like CLEPER as well as law students who demanded more practical experience from
their curricula. See for example Pincus, Clinical Practice Innovations in Law Schools, 28
BRIEFCASE 47 (1969).
The ultimate linkage between unrepresented interests and curriculum restructuring is
reflected at schools like the Antioch School of Law in Washington, D. C. The School's
founders, Jean and Edgar Cahn, designed the curriculum, faculty composition and admission
policies with the goal of producing lawyers that could best serve individuals and groups
currently unrepresented. See ANTIOCH SCHOOL OF LAW 1973-74 CATALOG AT 5-6. For a fuller
statement of the Cahns' philosophy concerning legal education see E. Cahn & J. Cahn, Power
To The People or the Profession?-The Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1025 (1970).
185. Labor unions, tenant organizations and various minority groups have used experi-
enced lawyers for many years to enhance their relative bargaining power with natural adver-
saries. More recently individual lawyers like Ralph Nader and Nicholas Johnson have used
specialized legal expertise to develop organizations that foster unrepresented interests and
mobilize financial support for such interests. See for example ACTON & LEMONDE, RALPH
NADER: A MAN AND A MOVEMENT (1972); BUCKHORN, NADER: THE PEOPLES' LAWYER (1972);
Reich, Success on a Shoestring, 5 JURIS DOCTOR 43 (July/August 1975); Schorr, Alan Morrison:
Even When He Loses, He Wins, 6 JuRIs DOCTOR 39 (Jan. 1976).
186. During the last decade many environmental and consumer groups became disen-
chanted with the "hearing" given their interests by administrative bodies like the Federal
Power Commission, U. S. Forest Service, Civil Aeronautics Board and Department of Trans-
portation. Consequently, they often re-allocated their advocacy resources toward the judici-
ary in hopes of developing judicial principles that would require agencies to accord them
greater deference. For example see Bieber, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC:
The AEC Learns the True Meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 3
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 316 (1973). In other instances under-represented groups have advocated
dissolution of agencies deemed to be structurally biased against their interests. The breakup
of the Atomic Energy Commission into the Energy Research & Development Agency and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission was stimulated in part by claims that safety considerations
of nuclear power development as well as the search for alternative energy sources were treated
as stepchildren whenever in conflict with optimal development of nuclear power reactors. For
example see, Symposium-The Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process, 15 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 487 (1974); Roisman, Suing for Safety, 10 TRIAL 13, 187 (Jan./Feb. 1974). For more
details on these developments see E. JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM (Russell Sage Foun-
dation, 1974); S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE: PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS, AND POOR PEOPLE (ABF
1974); S. BRAKEL, WISCONSIN JUDICARE: A PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL (ABF 1972); Hallauer, The
Shreveport Experiment in Prepaid Legal Services, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 223 (1973); Getman,
Critique of the Report of the Shreveport Experiment, 3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 487 (1974); and
Symposium-Legal Service Delivery Systems, 4 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 1 (1973). For additional
references see Brickmnn Legal Delivery . A. ;l . .. Q - T L E. L.
-. U. LEDO Rv. 465
(1973).
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be as highly variable as the formality of the decisional environment,
and the complexity of the tasks. Similarly, lawyer characteristics
would vary from an intellectual ignorance on and lack of experience
with novel legal tasks performed for emerging client groups, to high
levels of experience and intellect regarding traditional tasks and
long-established group interests. If the values on all these axes were
averaged and those averages connected by lines, the resulting shape
would be a sizable square reflecting considerable probabilities of
malpractice on all axes. This, in turn, would imply that approaches
for reducing the probabilities of malpractice could be obtained from
self-regulation or mechanisms external to the profession.
Analysis of the spectrum of group interests now being served,
or capable of being served by the profession, suggests that malprac-
tice frequently results from deficiencies in current skills and meth-
ods. These deficiencies stem from problems with lawyers as human
resources as well as from the current rigidity in the definition of
legal tasks. Both deficiencies are probably solvable through self-
regulation. Continued absence of profession self-regulation will
prompt groups now inadequately represented to fashion their own
remedies within the legal system or to promote their interests
outside the system.
A reduction of these representational deficiencies with cost
effective self-regulation will involve approaches that do not rely
heavily on error detection through peer group review. Since many
of the legal services needed by groups are unconventional and fre-
quently in a rapid state of evolution, peer review would only serve
as a retarding force for resolving deficiencies. Further, since the
legal forums involved in representing these groups are highly di-
verse, as is the level of client sophistication, not much reliance could
be placed on the environment or client groups to detect incompet-
ence regarding newly-developed skills and methods, although such
client groups would surely respond to inadequacies in performance.
Consequently, it seems logical to develop approaches that rely more
on constructive monitoring and positive incentives than on a deter-
rence philosophy.
The American Bar Foundation, and similar centralized re-
search activities of the practicing bar, represent perhaps the best
long-term solution for reducing professional incompetency regard-
ing servicing group interests. Annual reports of the ABF depict an
amazing amount of constructive research aimed at analyzing the
needs of various client groups and designing approaches for servic-
ing those needs, which rely heavily on the profession and its insti-
tutions. These studies indicate that much inadequate representa-
tion of these groups derives not from incompetence, but rather from
a lack of identification of the needs of groups as opposed to indivi-
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duals. Once these needs are properly identified, legal scholars and
practitioners can satisfy them through creative application of exist-
ing principles or the establishment of new principles and institu-
tions.
An excellent example of the utility of such research regarding
professional incompetence in meeting group needs relates to the
distribution of legal services. Research in the early sixties disclosed
great gaps in the profession's capacity to service many people that
could benefit from attorney assistance. The information was eventu-
ally translated into governmental programs like the OEO, as well
as experimental projects such as the Shreveport and Wisconsin
plans for prepaid legal services." 7 Now the ABA is completing a
substantial study of the middle class's legal needs.' This study will
surely spawn constructive approaches for aiding the middle class
with their legal problems without excessively taxing their financial
resources, already dwindling from inflation. Of course, these ap-
proaches merely identify long-standing needs not previously served.
The profession should also undertake research to anticipate the
legal needs and problems of groups so that appropriate legal services
are available at the inception of problems. Such foresight can help
prevent some problems from festering into the crises, which can
easily develop in our complex, interdependent society.
Obviously, basic research on group needs is the starting point
for positive improvement in the profession's service capabilities, but
unselfish initiatives for efficiently meeting these identified needs are
also required. If the profession actively promotes the use of parale-
gals, public-interest law firms, clinics, and specialists to meet spe-
cific group needs, it can simultaneously ensure development of these
special approaches consistent with existing professional elements
and concepts. If the profession resists such approaches or gives only
grudging support,' the approaches are unlikely to develop in coor-
dination with the profession's self-regulation activities.
C. Thoughts on the Interests of Society and a Suggestion.
Although the profession is preoccupied with rendering services
to individual clients and fashioning responses to the evolving needs
of client groups, jurisprudential literature has long recognized that
broad social interests are also served by a vital legal profession. The
188. See B. CURRAN & F. SPAULDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (ABF 1974) and
Special Issue, Survey of Legal Needs, 3 ALTERNATIVES 1 (Jan. 1976).
189. For discussion of such resistance see R. MARKS, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 186-197 (ABF 1972); Riedmueller, Group Legal Services and the
Organized Bar, 10 COL. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 228 (1974); and J. Falk Jr. & S. Pollak, Political
Interference with Publicly Funded Lawyers: The CRLA Controversy and the FUttare of Legal
Services, 25 HAST. L. J. 599 (1973).
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cancerous invasions of government into private lives are being re-
strained daily by representation of individuals and group inter-
ests. 190 Further, government activities are often made more efficient
by the efforts of lawyers toward the timely modification of existing
governing mechanisms, and the invention of totally new legal insti-
tutions and principles. Unfortunately, the latter efforts toward di-
rect service of public interests are not viewed as fundamental profes-
sion responsibilities. Consequently, self-regulation standards have
not been developed to ensure that lawyers discharge these responsi-
bilities with the highest degree of skill. This situation seems des-
tined to continue, even though the cost of incompetence in fashion-
ing legal institutions, principles, mechanisms, and personnel to
better serve broad public interests, easily exceeds the cost of incom-
petence in the representation of individual interests.'92
190. For diverse discussions and perspectives on this perpetual conflict see A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM at 171-210 (1967); E. COWAN, N. EGLESON & N. HENTOFF, STATE SECRETS
at 261-333 (1974); Kalo, Deterring Misuse of Confidential Government Information: A Pro-
posed Citizens Action, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1577 (1974); Wong, Ravin v. State: A Case for Privacy
and Possession of Pot, 5 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 178 (1975); Shattuck, Tilting at the Surveil-
lance Apparatus, 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES REv. 59 (1974); Denenbery, Administrative Searches and
the Right to Privacy in the United States, 23 INT. & COMp. L. Q. 169 (1974); Sindell, Kent
State: Opening the Doors, 10 TRIAL 43 (July/Aug. 1976); Comment, Privacy, Law Enforce-
ment, and Public Interest, 36 MONT. L. REv. 60 (1975). For an interesting overview of the
conflict see the Jan./Feb. 1975 issue of TRIAL (Vol. 10) which is dedicated to the topic.
191. Organization of the Office of Satellite Communications within the FCC, division
of the AEC into the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and creation of the International Telecommuni-
cations Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), and the Legal Services Corporation, are excellent
examples of how lawyers as legislators, administrators and legal technicians have used organi-
zational innovations to promote diverse social interests with optimal efficiency. For back-
ground on some of these developments see, e.g., HousE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, ENERGY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 707, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); SENATE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1973, S. REP. No. 980, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); T. Jacks & D. Raff, The Bureaucracy of Power, 10 TRIAL 28 (Jan./Feb.
1974); J. PELTON, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE POLICY (Lomond Books 1974). However
for a critical review of the INTELSAT innovation see M. KINSLEY, OUTERSPACE AND INNER
SANCTUMS: GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATION at 112-129 (1976).
Lawyers seeking to develop and promote reforms in government agency processes have
made significant progress through the Administrative Conference. For a sampling of the scope
of these activities see ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974-75 ANNUAL
REPORT at 11-67 (March 1976). Even without the benefit of organizations, individual lawyers
have initiated significant reforms in legal principles such as no-fault insurance. See R. KEE-
TON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM-A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
192. As mentioned earlier, the conceptual framework of OSHA and its implementing
regulations have caused major problems, which could have been anticipated by lawyers
trained to be sensitive to side effects as well as the focus effects of major legal initiatives
administered through traditional bureaucratic organizations. See generally the July/Aug.
1973 (Vol. 9) and Sept./Oct. 1975 (Vol. 11) issues of TRIAL which are devoted to a general
discussion of OSHA from many perspectives. It has also been argued by some prominent
scholars that many FDA regulations have produced adverse side effects that overshadow the
desired benefits. Presumably perceptive legal draftsmen could have anticipated such prob-
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In the light of the high cost of this incompetence, it would seem
prudent to allocate some resources to understanding its systemic
impact on direct service to public interests. If we again employ the
calculus and view various broad public interests as the client, many
interesting insights should result as we plot the values for the re-
maining three axes. In most instances, the complexity of the legal
tasks rates very high, the environmental formality is very low, and
lawyer training and experience is also low.
Degree of Informality
and Absence of Profession
Peers
/ N\
/ N
/
/ N
/ N
Degree of Lawyer
Incapacity Concerning Degree of
Intellect and/or -- Task Complexity
Experience \ /
\ /
N /
Degree of Lack of
Constituency Sophistication
and Knowledge Concerning
Professional Service Rendered
The resulting square is the largest of any of the three constituencies.
If self-regulation focuses directly on the profession's incompetence
in serving these interests, substantial improvements could result
almost immediately. Similarly, the probabilities of harm from in-
competence can be substantially reduced by efforts undertaken out-
side the profession.
Although almost any form of self-regulation could be of value,
it seems illogical to employ an approach that dwells on deterrence,
since detection will be most difficult due to the amorphous and
unsophisticated nature of the constituent interest as well as the
absence of formality within the environment. Further, many of the
lems. See for example Friedman, "Frustrating Drug Advancement," Newsweek, Jan. 8, 1973,
at 49 and Friedman, "Barking Cats", Newsweek, Feb. 17, 1973, at 70. Similarly other scholars
have suggested that many corporate controls drafted by lawyers have failed to produce de-
sired results because of a basic professional ignorance of the realities of corporate and organi-
zational behavior. See C. SToNr., WHERE LAW ENDs: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR (1975).
64
Montana Law Review, Vol. 37 [1976], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/1
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
tasks lawyers could undertake in direct service to society could also
be undertaken by non-professionals. There would be little incentive
to detect lawyer incompetence merely to improve the service re-
ceived from that profession. It is more likely that the general public
would simply solicit the services of the other groups, which have
better performance records."3
Some suggestions for reducing incompetent service to client
groups might also be of value here. Research, such as that carried
out by the ABF, can improve understanding of broad social systems
in which the "public" lawyer must operate.9 4 Research and educa-
tional institutions can also aid in fashioning better skills and meth-
ods for executing these unique responsibilities. 1"5 Such improved
skills and methods, as well as increased knowledge about the envi-
ronment in which they are applied, can reduce the probability of
incompetent service to the public interests, since these factors will
tend to generate forms of specialization. However, some attempt
should also be made to directly improve lawyer performance. Ob-
viously the negligence approach is ill-designed for this objective.
The extensive nature of the damages flowing from incompetent per-
formance in the public sector would make redistribution of wealth
a totally unrealistic remedy, and the diffuse nature of lawyer activi-
ties affecting the general public interest would make the deterrence
effect of negligence litigation de minimus.
A better way to deal directly with incompetent performance is
to foster competence directly, rather than seeking to eliminate in-
competence. A simple way to undertake this task is to develop a
system of prizes for lawyers who, in their daily practice with individ-
uals and client groups, discharge their obligations to those groups
through the development of legal principles, institutions, and mech-
193. Although lawyers have been traditional developers of the basic principles and
statutory details of government programs affecting broad segments of society, other disci-
plines are challenging lawyers' supremacy on such matters. Economists have assumed consid-
erable prominence during the past decade and specialists in planning, budgeting, and busi-
ness administration will also challenge lawyer supremacy in the public sector as the machina-
tions of government at all levels become more complex. For an interesting summary of forces
underlying the profession's decline see Special Report, "The Troubled Professions," Business
Week, Aug. 16, 1976, at 126.
194. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1975 at 5-47 (1976).
195. The following articles indicate the breadth and depth of current research: Rehbin-
der, Development and Present State of Fact Research in Law in the United States, 24 J.
LEGAL ED. 567 (1972); Cavers, "Non-traditional" Research by Law Teachers: Returns from
the Questionnaire of the Council on Law-related Studies, 24 J. LEGAL ED. 534 (1972); Clapp,
Legal Research and Legal Development: The Role of a New Jersey Law Institute, 28 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1053 (1975); and Conference-Developments in Law & Social Sciences Research, 52
N.C. L. REV. 1-120 (June, 1974). However, some view these activities to be less than needed.
For example see Gazell, Overdue Revolution Deferred: Researching the Law, UTAH L. REV.
22 (1972).
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anisms that simultanously promote the broad public interest.' 6
Such prizes should be sufficiently widespread to reward innova-
tions, which foster public interests at the local, state, and federal
levels. Screening panels would evaluate the various entries submit-
ted in competition for the prizes. These screening panels would
ideally involve both lawyers and non-lawyers to ensure that contri-
butions are evaluated from a broad perspective. The screening pan-
els, apart from ensuring that prizes are awarded for the best per-
formances in the public interest, would also inculcate panel mem-
bers with the many ways in which the profession can directly pro-
mote the public welfare. Eventually the publicity given the entries,
as well as the knowledge acquired by the screening panel members,
would allow the profession to evolve professional standards which
would directly ensure the development of skilled public administra-
tors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The issue of incompetent professional practice is extremely
complex. Once one delves into the subject area in enough depth to
appreciate its complexity, it is, as Alice found, difficult to return to
a single perspective. Unfortunately, during the course of this article
we have not had the time to carefully examine many of the interest-
ing boulders encountered on the terrain of professional malpractice.
We have instead concentrated only on elements of major import-
ance, the mountains and valleys of that terrain, and have attempted
to interrelate them in a manner that we believe may advance
thoughtful consideration of this important subject. Although the
article raises many issues, it is probably best to conclude with an
assessment of what we feel are the most important among them.
In our minds any meaningful treatment of professional incom-
petence must simultaneously take into account the lawyer, the task
being performed, the constituencies directly served by the lawyer,
and the environment embracing the lawyer, constituency, and task
involved. Programs for dealing with professional incompetence that
fail to consider each of these elements, and their interrelationships,
will fail in the long term to resolve the problems for which they were
designed.
Once the four elements are taken into account, it is obvious
that self-regulation alone cannot adequately deal with the incom-
196. Examples of legal activities worthy of such prizes are: innovative use of paralegals
and new technology like videotape to accelerate case disposition and reduce costs; novel
applications of the condominium concept to multiparty business ventures; and new ap-
pro-ches for financing consumer treble damagc actions against large en erprises, such as
issuing stock to plaintiff participants to raise money for litigation costs.
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petence issue. In some areas, no doubt, self-regulation can do the
whole job. In other situations, professional incompetence can be
effectively limited only by forces outside the professsion. However,
there remains a vast area where optimal solutions require a combi-
nation of self-regulation and external involvement. The profession
will do itself and the public a favor if, in these areas, it takes the
initiative in establishing basic standards for use by outsiders to deal
with professional incompetence. Conversely, the profession would
do well to refrain from claiming total supervision of the processes
for dealing with such incompetence. The public is now too wise to
allow the fox to guard the henhouse.
In developing these basic standards, the profession must not
dwell excessively on the morality of conduct. To remain a guiding
force in dealing with incompetence, the profession must aggressively
develop standards on skills, methods, and performance. Once estab-
lished, these standards will both aid outsiders in taking effective
action in dealing with incompetence as it concerns their interests,
and will simultaneously restrain the range of discretion outsiders
have in dealing with matters that directly affect the profession.
Finally, the most important point in the article is that any
notion of professional competence must recognize that the profes-
sion has a direct obligation to society. As our society becomes more
complex, the importance of this direct obligation to society in-
creases. We have long been fundamental participants in the devel-
opment of public institutions for serving public needs. However, it
is time to recognize that, in addition to rights of participation, we
have the obligation of participation, because we have unique and
valuable perspectives on the mechanics of human and institutional
behavior. We cannot hope to fulfill this obligation without recogniz-
ing minimal standards of performance and taking steps to ensure
that those minimal standards are met by all who engage in this type
of professional activity.
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